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ABSTRACT. The 2008 financial crisis has prompted widespread criticism of the bankruptcy
safe harbors for repurchase agreements (repos) and derivatives, which allow a failed firm's
counterparties to enforce these contracts outside of the bankruptcy process. The emerging
consensus holds that these provisions facilitated a run on the assets of troubled institutions such
as Lehman Brothers, and should be curtailed to afford such firms greater protection from their
counterparties. In contrast, this Note argues that proposals to roll back the safe harbors would
afford little relief to already-bankrupt firms while substantially undermining the efficiency and
stability of the affected markets. Exposing these contracts to bankruptcy risk would render them
unsuitable for a valuable function that they serve in the financial markets: offering institutional
investors a liquid store of value akin to an insured bank deposit. And it would cause the supply
of capital through these instruments to fluctuate, pro-cyclically, based on perceptions of risk to
the financial system. The lessons of past crises suggest that a more promising approach would
give distressed firms the emergency liquidity they need to weather a panic-not a stay on their
obligations once they are already in bankruptcy.
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INTRODUCTION
The tremors that shook Wall Street in 2oo8 radiated from a set of novel
asset markets straddling the boundary between commercial banking and the
capital markets. Mortgage-backed securities and related funding instruments
had transformed the credit landscape during the preceding years, enabling
institutional investors to supply capital for residential mortgages and other
opportunities once accessible only to deposit-taking banks.' Thus a "shadow"
banking system emerged alongside the regulated banking sector, and grew to
rival it in size by its 2007 peak.2 Only a year later this system collapsed,' taking
with it many of the country's leading financial institutions and plunging the
economy into a deep recession.4
Despite the complexity of the transactions involved, the basic dynamics of
the 2008 crisis were distressingly familiar. A classic banking panic had
occurred,5 although it struck outside the traditional banking sector and the
regulatory institutions protecting it.6 Banking crises occur when depositors
1. Shadow banks financed hundreds of billions of subprime mortgages in 2005 and 2006
alone. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J.
FIN. ECON. 425, 430 (2012); see also Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, The Credit
Crisis: Conjectures About Causes and Remedies, 99 AM. ECON. REv. 606, 6o6 (2009)
(explaining how securitization attracted foreign investment to the U.S. housing market).
2. Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 5 & fig.i (July 2010),
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff-reports/sr458_July_2ooversion.pdf.
3. For example, quarterly issuance of consumer asset-backed securities (ABS) had fallen from
an average of $5o billion to $70 billion in pre-crisis years to just $2 billion at the end of
2008. Jeremy C. Stein, Securitization, Shadow Banking & Financial Fragility, 139 DAEDALUS
41,41 (2oo).
4. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that
of "the 13 ... most important financial institutions in the United States, 12 were at risk of
failure within a period of a week or two" in September 2008. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N,
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND EcoNOMic CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 441, 479 (2011).
s. See GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON'T SEE THEM
COMING 182 (2012) ("The global financial crisis . . . was triggered by a bank run, just like
those of 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, 1907, and 1933."). For a useful summary of this thesis, see
Bryan J. Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta, Is Shadow Banking Really Banking?, REGIONAL
ECONOMIST, Oct. 2011, at 8, http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/pub-assets/pdf/re/2011
/d/shadow banking.pdf.
6. "The shadow banking system has existed outside the explicit banking safety net and, in
most cases, with minimal regulatory constraints." Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation
After the Crisis, 1 HARv. Bus. L. REv. 75, 87 (2011). In contrast, traditional banks generally
expanded their balance sheets even as the nonbank financial sector deleveraged sharply
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demand more withdrawals than the system's limited cash reserves can satisfy,
forcing banks to liquidate assets or seek emergency assistance.7 Like traditional
banks, shadow banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers held large
portfolios linked to mortgages and other conventional bank receivables.
However, these institutions funded themselves using commercial paper and
other short-term borrowing markets that lacked the stabilizing influence of
FDIC deposit insurance.' This left shadow banks vulnerable to a dramatic loss
of liquidity as capital fled from mortgage-related assets in 2007 and 20o8,9
forcing officials to rescue entities that lacked access to backstops such as the
Federal Reserve's discount window."o
Complicating matters, shadow banks faced a paradoxical legal situation as
they edged toward the precipice in 2008: although they were regulated as
nonbanks, applicable insolvency law treated these institutions rather like
traditional banks. As we shall see, this paradox meant that shadow banks were
excluded from both the regulatory safeguards available to commercial banks
under Tide 12 and certain bankruptcy protections available to nonbanks under
Tide 1.
during the crisis. See Zhiguo He et al., Balance Sheet Adjustments During the 2008 Crisis, 58
IMFEcON. REV. i8, 120-21 (2010).
7. See GORTON, supra note 5, at 5 ("A financial crisis in its pure form is an exit from bank
debt.... Financial intermediaries cannot possibly honor these short-term debt obligations if
they are withdrawn or not renewed."); Ricks, supra note 6, at 84 ("[R]uns ... occur when
large numbers of funding providers with near-term maturities decline to renew their
contracts upon expiration.").
8. See Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Money, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy, 99 AM. ECON.
REV. 6oo, 6oo (2009) ("At the margin, all financial intermediaries (including commercial
banks) have to borrow in capital markets, since deposits are insufficiently responsive to
funding needs. But for a commercial bank, its large balance sheet masks the effects of
operating at the margin.").
9. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 23 J.
ECON. PERSP. 77, 78 (2009) ("[B]anks increasingly financed their asset holdings with
shorter maturity instruments. This change left banks particularly exposed to a dry-up in
funding liquidity."); Paul A. McCulley, Teton Reflections, GLOBAL CENTRAL BANK FOCUs
(PIMCO), Aug./Sept. 2007, at 2, http://media.pimco.corrVDocuments/GCB%2oFocus%20
Sept%2007%20WEB.pdf ("[U]nregulated shadow banks fund themselves with un-insured
commercial paper, which may or may not be backstopped by liquidity lines from real banks.
Thus, the shadow banking system is particularly vulnerable to runs-commercial paper
investors refusing to re-up when their paper matures, leaving the shadow banks with a
liquidity crisis.. . .").
lo. This situation proved untenable. By September 2008, "all the five of the largest independent
investment banks had either closed down (Lehman Brothers), merged into other entities
(Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch), or converted to bank holding companies to be supervised
by the Federal Reserve (Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley)." FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY
COMM'N, supra note 4, at 154.
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Banks are not eligible debtors under the Bankruptcy Code," and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act provides neither a general stay nor avoiding
powers to protect them from their depositors' claims.12 In contrast, the
Bankruptcy Code gives debtors protection from their creditors' recovery efforts
through the automatic stay,' avoidance of preferential transfers," and related
provisions.s Yet unlike most debtors, shadow banks traded heavily in contracts
that are exempt from protections ordinarily available to debtors in bankruptcy."i
These include repurchase agreements (repos), a short-term borrowing
instrument that Bear Stearns, for example, used to stay afloat during its final
months as an independent company;" and derivative contracts, which Wall
Street firms used to trade mortgage-related risk.'" The statutory exemptions
for these contracts allow the parties to enforce their contractual rights outside
of bankruptcy proceedings. 9 These typically include the right to liquidate
collateral from, and to terminate dealings and net mutual obligations with, a
ni. 1n U.S.C. S og(b)(2) (20o6).
12. See Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: A
Comparison and Evaluation, 2VA. L.& Bus. REV. 143, 157-58, 164 (2007).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (20o6).
14. 11 U.S.C. 5 547 (b) (20o6).
is. "Thus, while most contracts ... are automatically stayed by courts in the event of a
corporate bankruptcy, the opposite situation obtains in the event of a bank's insolvency."
Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 158-59.
16. E.g., 11 U.S.C. 5 362(b) (20o6) (automatic stay); id. § 546(e)-(g) (avoiding powers);
id. § 54 8(d)(2)(B)-(E) (fraudulent transfers); id. § 555 (general exemption for securities
contracts); id. § 556 (commodities or forward contracts); id. § 5S9 (repos); id. § 560 (swap
agreements); id. § 561 (cross-product netting). These carve-outs are reflected in analogous
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 210(C),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1477 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5390(c) (West
2012)), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which uses the term "qualified financial
contract" to describe "any securities contract, commodity contract, forward contract,
repurchase agreement, swap agreement, and any similar agreement that the [FDIC]
determines . . . to be a qualified financial contract" eligible for certain exemptions from
mandatory resolution procedures, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(i) (2oo6).
17. A repo is essentially a secured loan characterized as a "sale" of collateral (usually securities)
coupled with a promise to buy back ("repurchase") the collateral at the transaction's
maturity for a small premium. In this way, a cash lender receives both security and a
promised rate of return on a short-term loan. FIN. CRisis INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 4, at
31. Bear Steams's repo borrowings rose from $69 billion to $102 billion during 2007 as it
found itself locked out of the unsecured commercial paper market. Id. at 283.
is. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM,
FACTORS AFFECTING EFFORTS To LIMIT PAYMENTS TO AIG COUNTERPARTIES 3 (2009).
ig. See supra note 16.
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distressed counterparty.2 o
The statutory carve-outs, or "safe harbors," are traditionally justified by the
need to protect the financial system from the fallout of a major market
participant's failure."' Yet the exercise of these rights facilitated a kind of bank
run on weak institutions as their counterparties moved to protect themselves
from the deepening crisis in 2008.
The run on the shadow banking system was most apparent in the repo
market, which provided "the main source of funds" for the securitization
process.' Like bank depositors, repo lenders have the option to withdraw
credit almost immediately, as many repo loans mature overnight and
must be rolled over daily." By 2008, much of the collateral that shadow banks
could offer to secure their repo borrowings consisted of structured products
tied to the mortgage market or otherwise affected by the credit squeeze.4
As this form of collateral grew increasingly unacceptable to repo lenders,
Bear Stearns and other institutions struggled to raise the cash necessary to
continue operating.25
20. See Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral,
and Closeout 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2005-03, 2005),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=73o648 (stressing "the ability of these contracts to net or setoff
offsetting positions between counterparties, to access collateral promptly, and to close-out
or terminate positions quickly without being subject to prolonged legal stays").
21. See, e.g., Shmuel Vasser, Derivatives in Bankruptcy, 60 Bus. LAw. 1507, 1510 (2005) (locating
the public rationale of the safe harbors in the need "to protect American financial markets
and institutions from the ripple effects resulting from a bankruptcy filing by a major
participant in the financial markets"). "Since its adoption in 1978, the Bankruptcy Code has
been amended several times to afford different treatment for certain financial transactions
upon the bankruptcy of a debtor . . . to further the policy goal of minimizing the systemic
risk potentially arising from certain interrelated financial activities and markets." H.R. REP.
No. 105-688, pt. 1, at 2 (1998).
22. Gorton & Metrick, supra note I, at 425.
23. See Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 13 (2010),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/nyfrb-triparty-.whitepaper.pdf.
24. See, e.g., FIN. CIusIs INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 4, at 284 ("Often, backing Bear's
borrowing were mortgage-related securities and of these, $17.2 billion- more than Bear's
equity-were Level 3 assets," meaning that they lacked observable prices.). In the case of
nonsubprime asset-backed securities, "the problem was that if a large bank failed or had to
dump assets for other reasons ... then prices of these asset classes would fall." GARY
GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 134 (2010).
25. See Martin N. Baily et al., Improving Resolution Options for Systemically Relevant Financial
Institutions 7-8 (Oct. 2oog) (Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation),
http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/27243/1/Improving%2oresolution
%20options%2oforo/o20systematically/2orelevant/20financial%20institutions.pdf. From August
2007 to January 2009, repo haircuts rose from near o% to 45%, signaling a massive drop in
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Major institutions also hemorrhaged cash through their derivative
contracts, which gave parties the right to demand collateral as their
counterparties weakened and terminate contracts in events of default.26 For
example, AIG and other firms that had sold "protection" against losses on
mortgage-backed securities were required to put up cash as these securities
plunged in value and as their own finances weakened. By mid-September
20o8, AIG had posted more than $19.5 billion in collateral on credit default
swaps written by its Financial Products subsidiary. Mounting demands from
its counterparties ultimately forced a costly rescue by the New York Federal
Reserve and the Treasury Department."
These episodes have motivated a growing body of scholarship calling for a
rollback of the safe harbors for repos and derivatives, so that distressed firms
can invoke traditional bankruptcy protections against their counterparties
under these contracts. Proponents of a more protective insolvency regime
find three principal defects in the safe harbors. First, by permitting
counterparties to withdraw credit and seize collateral from weak institutions,
the safe harbors may expose weak firms to a sudden loss of liquidity that can
quickly spread to other firms. Second, the race to grab the assets of an
the amount a financial institution could borrow against a given portfolio. See Gorton &
Metrick, supra note 1, at 429 fig.4.
26. For example, Lehman Brothers's counterparties "had the right under U.S. bankruptcy law
to terminate their derivative contracts with Lehman upon its bankruptcy, and to the extent
that Lehman owed them money on the contracts they could seize any Lehman collateral they
held." FIN. CRIsIs INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 4, at 354.
27. See id. at 344-50. See generally GORTON, supra note 24, at 128 ("Collateral calls . . . were
massive, creating liquidity problems for some and windfall funding for others.").
28. See, e.g., David A. Price, The Dodd-Frank Act and Insolvency 2.o, REGION Focus, 3d Quarter
2011, at 8, http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/region-focus/2o1/q3/pdf
/federal reserve.pdf; Darrell Duffie & David A. Skeel, Jr., A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits
of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements (Scholarship at Penn Law,
Working Paper No. 397, 2012), http://sr.nellco.org/upenn wps/397; Baily et al., supra note
25, at 3 ("The priority treatment currently given to these contracts should be reevaluated to
determine if it unnecessarily adds to systemic risk."); Stephen J. Lubben, A Consensus Begins
To Emerge on Derivatives in Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMEs: DEALBOOK (Apr. 27, 2012, 11:59 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.coM/201/O4/27/a-consensus-begins-to-emerge-on-derivatives-in
-bankruptcy.
29. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., Resolution Authority, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE
DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 213, 229 (Viral V.
Acharya et al. eds., 2011); Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the
Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 1o6 (2005); Randall S.
Kroszner, Making Markets More Robust, in REFORMING U.S. FINANCIAL MARKETS:
REFLECTIONS BEFORE AND BEYOND DODD-FRANK 51, 77 (Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 2011);
Edward R. Morrison, Is the Bankruptcy Code an Adequate Mechanism for Resolving the Distress
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insolvent firm can hamper its orderly resolution and destroy going-concern
value.30 Third, counterparties whose contractual rights are unfettered by
bankruptcy procedures may lack optimal incentives to monitor their
counterparties' risk-taking and may overuse contracts protected by the safe
harbors."
Breaking with the emerging consensus, this Note argues that repealing the
safe harbors would be a misdirected response to the fragility of nonbank
financial companies. Part I lays the foundation for an account of the role of the
safe harbors in the supply of liquidity through the shadow banking system. I
proceed from the premise that "financial instruments, markets, and institutions
of Systemically Important Institutions?, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 449, 451-52 (2009); Mark J. Roe, The
Derivatives Market's Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539,
564-69 (2011); David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L. 1, 10-13 (2009); David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency
and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 166-68 (2012); Bryan G. Faubus,
Note, Narrowing the Bankruptcy Safe Harbor for Derivatives To Combat Systemic Risk, 59 DUKE
L.J. 8oi, 827 (2oo); Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 19; Baily et al., supra note 25, at 7.
30. See, e.g., Too Big To Fail: The Role for Bankruptcy and Antitrust Law in Financial Regulation
Reform (Part I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm.
on thejudiciary, iith Cong. 72 (2009) (statement of Harvey R. Miller, Senior Partner, Weil,
Gotshal & Manges LLP) (arguing that the exercise of close-out rights by 733,000
counterparties "caused a massive destruction of value for Lehman" following the investment
bank's bankruptcy filing); DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE
DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 162 (2011) ("The simple
expedient of giving managers the benefit of the stay would make bankruptcy a much more
viable option for a systemically important firm."); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Requiem for the
Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank Regulation, 85 IND. L.J. 777, 8u (2olo); Stephen J.
Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319, 320 (2010); Robert R.
Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Resolving Large Complex Financial Institutions: The Case for
Reorganization o-n (Apr. ni, 2on) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.clevelandfed
.org/research/conferences/2on/4-14-201 /Bliss Kaufman.pdf.
31. See, e.g., SKEEI, supra note 30; Thomas H. Jackson, Chapter nF: A Proposal for the Use of
Bankruptcy To Resolve Financial Institutions, in ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS As WE KNow
THEM 217, 236 (Kenneth E. Scott et al. eds., 2009); Roe, supra note 29, at 555 ("The
Bankruptcy Code's core negative consequence from favoring derivatives contracts and
repurchase agreements is to slacken the contracting parties' efforts to contain the risk of
counterparty failure."); see also Acharya et al., supra note 29, at 230 ("The effective outcome is
tremendous liquidity in repo markets for these products in good times, with systemic stress
and fragility when the products are anticipated to experience losses. The expansion of safe
harbor to repo transactions with underlying mortgage-backed assets . .. has been cited as one
of the reasons . . . ."); Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, Should Derivatives Be
Privileged in Bankruptcy? (July 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.gsb.columbia.edu
/faculty/moehmke/papers/BoltonOehmkeDerivatives.pdf (arguing that risks shifted to
firms' general creditors are more efficiently borne by their derivative counterparties).
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arise to mitigate the effects of information and transaction costs."" On this
view, bank deposits, for example, create valuable liquidity by offering an
investment contract free from the due-diligence and other transaction costs
that hamper trading in virtually every other asset class, from home loans to
technology stocks." Banks accomplish this by issuing what I call liquidation
rights, or options to convert assets to cash. For example, a bank depositor
indirectly invests in the bank's loan portfolio but retains the right to withdraw
her investment without taking a loss. In this way, banking transforms illiquid
portfolio assets into a liquid investment contract that enlarges the supply of
capital that households are willing to invest.
The subsequent Parts argue that rights allowing repo and derivative
counterparties to liquidate these contracts outside bankruptcy play an
analogous role in attracting capital from these "depositors" in the shadow
banking system. 4 In this way, the safe harbors may not only expand the supply
of loanable capital, but they may also make that supply more resilient by
insulating investors from bankruptcy risk. If it was a loss of repo credit that
ultimately felled Bear Stearns, this was because other funding sources with
fewer privileges in bankruptcy had long since become unavailable to the
troubled investment bank.
My claim that the law should enforce bank-issued liquidation rights should
not be confused with an argument that the banking system should be allowed
to fail during a crisis. 6 Critics of the safe harbors are undoubtedly right about
32. Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 J. EcoN.
LITERATURE 688, 689 (1997). See generally Douglass C. North, Economic Performance
Through Time, 84 Am. EcON. REV. 359, 360 (1994) ("When it is costly to transact, then
institutions matter.").
33. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,
91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 409 (1983) ("It is precisely the 'transformation' of illiquid assets into
liquid assets that is responsible both for the liquidity service provided by banks and for their
susceptibility to runs."). See generally Michael Aitken & Carole Comerton-Forde,. How
Should Liquidity Be Measured?, 11 PAc.-BASIN FIN. J. 45, 46 (2003) ("A perfectly liquid market
is one where any amount of a given security can be instantaneously converted to cash and
back to securities at no cost.").
34. See GORTON, supra note 24, at 7 (arguing that "demand deposits [and] repo with collateral"
play analogous roles in the supply of "[t]ransactions (or 'liquidity')").
3s. See FIN. CIUSIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 4, at 283. To be sure, eventually all "[s]hort-
term near money market instruments with a risk of loss-uninsured deposits, commercial
paper, and repos-respond to increases in risk primarily through [a contraction in]
quantity." Charles W. Calomiris, The Subprime Turmoil: What's Old, What's New, and
What's Next, 15 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 6, 24 (2009).
36. As Gorton has written, "banks should be liquidated if they cannot honor their debt in
noncrisis periods, but not during a crisis." GORTON, supra note 5, at 149.
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the consequences of allowing a large institution to unravel under pressure from
its repo and derivative counterparties Yet if Lehman Brothers should have
gained protection from its counterparties in September 2008, this should have
come in the form of emergency liquidity, not a judicial stay imposed after the
firm was already in bankruptcy. Curtailing the safe harbors would seemingly
do little to expand the options available to troubled firms ex post, while doing
much to undermine the liquidity and stability of the repo and derivative
markets ex ante.
The challenge for regulators, then, is to supply a framework that reduces
the incidence of bank runs at minimal cost to bank liquidity creation. If this
task seems daunting, it may be helpful to recall that today's regulated banking
sector was once "an inherently fragile, shadow banking system operating
without credible public-sector backstops and limited regulation."39 Yet
twentieth-century regulators enacted a mix of deposit insurance and prudential
oversight that largely ended the threat of panics in the traditional banking
sector. An insolvency regime that curtailed depositors' rights in order to
prop up weak banks was conspicuously absent from this formula, since it
would have undermined the very liquidity services that regulators sought
to protect. 4o Seen in this light, the current so-called "special treatment""1 of
repos and derivatives in bankruptcy is far from anomalous: more remarkable
was the absence, in 2oo8, of regulatory mechanisms to ensure the shadow
banking system's resilience to crises of confidence. Instead of trying to
legislate away financial fragility through insolvency law, policymakers
should work toward a regulatory regime for shadow banking that approaches
37. See, e.g., Acharya et al., supra note 29, at 229 (describing the attendant "form of systemic risk
involving fire sales ... and liquidity funding spirals").
38. As Morgan Ricks argues, a bankruptcy stay on counterparties' recovery efforts would offer a
counterproductive method for arresting a bank run because, rather than preserving the
bank's liquidity, "imposing a legal stay on money-claims would instantly turn them into
non-money, which is exactly [the outcome to be avoided]." Ricks, supra note 6, at 112; see
also Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 3o, at to ("Adding [automatic] stays ... will not be
suffic[ient] to solve this dilemma.... Stays can suspend collection of debts but they cannot
force continued rolling over of funding or provision of services.").
39. Pozsar et al., supra note 2, at 1; see also GORTON, supra note 5, at 28 (" [T]he private sector's
attempts at money creation-first private banknotes and then demand deposits-were
plagued by difficulties rooted in the inability of the private sector to create riskless
collateral . . . .").
40. See generally Charles W. Calomiris, Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective, So
J. EcoN. HIST. 283, 284 n.4 (1990) (identifying "the desire to preserve liquidity" as the core
motivation of deposit insurance legislation).
41. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 29.
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their successes in the traditional banking sector.
I. THE DEMAND FOR LIQUIDITY AND THE ROLE OF BANK INSOLVENCY LAW
Capital traded through repos and derivative contracts has been spotted
fleeing the scene of recent history's most prominent financial disruptions,
including the 1998 failure of Long-Term Capital Management; the liquidity
crises of Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and other firms
in 2008; and the bankruptcy of MF Global in 2011. Accordingly, critics of the
safe harbors have argued that ordinary bankruptcy protections should be
available to stanch the outflow of liquidity through the repo and derivative
books of troubled institutions.
However, this Part argues that such proposals elide important distinctions
between the functional principles of bankruptcy law and bank regulation.
Bankruptcy generally aims to protect assets from inefficient liquidation and to
return an equitable and incentive-compatible recovery to each claimant. Most
legal scholars have analyzed repos and derivatives from this perspective,
arguing that bankruptcy-law safeguards should be used to protect firms from
chaotic unraveling by their counterparties. In contrast, modern approaches to
bank regulation recognize that the efficiency of markets for many financial
contracts would be undermined if participants could not transact without
exposing themselves to uncertainty and delay in a counterparty's insolvency
proceeding.42
The choice between bankruptcy and bank-regulatory approaches depends
on the nature of the costs imposed by a firm's failure. Bankruptcy is adapted
for the typical case where coordination problems prevent creditors' recovery
efforts from achieving an optimal allocation of a failed firm's assets and default
losses. Financial institutions also encounter coordination problems among
customers or creditors racing to withdraw cash or seize collateral. 43 However,
the resolution of failed financial intermediaries raises additional functional
considerations relating to these firms' role as suppliers of liquidity."
Liquidity is the ability to trade an asset at minimal cost or delay.4s
42. See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 154-55.
43. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 33, at 401; cf.Sudipto Bhattacharya & Douglas Gale,
Preference Shocks, Liquidity, and Central Bank Policy, in LIQUIDITY AND CRISES 35 (Franklin
Allen et al. eds., 2011) (characterizing the central bank as a solution to the free-rider problem
in interbank lending).
44. See, e.g., supra note 40 and accompanying text.
45. See Aitken & Comerton-Forde, supra note 33, at 46.
470
122:460 2012
BANKRUPTCY-PROOF FINANCE AND THE SUPPLY OF LIQUIDITY
Securities firms, for example, facilitate the issuance and exchange of securities
by acting as "market makers" who stand ready to buy or sell securities on
demand.46 Commercial banks create liquidity for their depositors by allowing
them to easily invest or divest their savings. The next Section will rehearse an
account of how bank-created liquidity generates valuable gains in market
efficiency. At this stage, however, it suffices to observe that when a financial
intermediary fails, there is a tradeoff between the typical mechanisms of
bankruptcy law - staying or clawing back creditors' recoveries - and the failed
firm's role in supplying customers with immediate access to funds. For this
reason, financial intermediaries have historically been excluded from the
mandatory provisions of the Bankruptcy Code."
These same considerations, I will argue, justify the bankruptcy exemptions
for transactions in the repo and derivatives markets. Ironically, the argument
for excluding certain financial contracts from conventional bankruptcy
mechanisms has much in common with the argument for bankruptcy itself.
Both are rooted in the central observations of institutional economics that
information or transaction costs may limit the efficiency of atomistic financial
markets."
A. Banking as Liquidity Creation
An efficient financial system should allocate society's scarce savings to all
projects with expected returns exceeding their cost of capital.49 However, due
to information and transaction costs, most investments incur some amount of
liquidity risk: an investor may be unable to sell her asset without loss when she
experiences a need for cash. Relatively few assets are financed with liquid
claims such as common stock or bonds. Most, such as homes or businesses, can
be sold only after incurring substantial search costs, due diligence, and other
46. See generally Sanford J. Grossman & Merton H. Miller, Liquidity and Market Structure, 43 J.
FIN. 617, 618 (1988) (describing how "market makers" satisfy "the demand for immediacy"
among market participants by "maintaining a continuous presence in the market").
47. See ii U.S.C. § lo9(b)-(d) (2006) (excluding insurance companies, banks, stockbrokers,
and commodity brokers from relief under portions of the Bankruptcy Code).
48. See Levine, supra note 32, at 690 ("The costs of acquiring information and making
transactions create incentives for the emergence of financial markets and institutions."). See
generally Sudipto Bhattacharya & Anjan V. Thakor, Contemporary Banking Theory, 3 J. FIN.
INTERMEDIATION 2 (1993) (surveying theories of banking).
49. See, e.g., Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth: Theory and
Evidence, 32 J. MONETARY ECON. 513 (1993).
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transaction or agency costs."o Thus, an investor in an illiquid asset need not
only evaluate the underlying investment opportunity: there is also the risk that
she may at some point be forced to sell the asset at a discount to raise cash.s"
Even socially valuable projects may be unable to attract funding for this
reason.5 2
In response, banks supply liquidity by offering a deposit contract, which
allows households to invest their savings while retaining on-demand access to
funds.s" This liquidation right performs two liquidity-creating functions.5 4
First, deposits may be withdrawn at any time notwithstanding the long
maturities of the bank loans that they finance; this function is known as
maturity transformation.5  Second, bank deposits are information-insensitive,
meaning that the depositor need not monitor her bank account as vigilantly as
5o. See GORTON, supra note 5, at 46 ("You could not realize the value of [a Van Gogh] painting
at short notice unless you were willing to take a great loss."). For further discussion, see
Levine, supra note 32, at 690-96.
51. Imagine an investor who has lent $i million to a small-business owner and now seeks to sell
the loan to an arm's-length buyer. If the loan matures in five years, each buyer would have
to incur costs evaluating the borrower's business prospects over a five-year time horizon.
Moreover, buyers might rightly interpret the investor's attempt to sell the loan as a
discouraging signal about the borrower's credit risk. Thus the investor may find the loan
impossible to sell.
52. See Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, Private and Public Supply ofLiquidity, io6 J. POL. ECON.
1, 2 (1998) ("The wedge between the full value of the firm and the external value of the firm
prevents it from financing all projects that have a positive net present value."); Jean Tirole,
Illiquidity and All Its Friends, 49 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 287, 291 (2011) ("Financial market
imperfections, which encompass moral hazard, adverse selection (asymmetries of
information about assets in place and projects), and mere transaction costs, make it hard for
cash-strapped corporations to raise financing even for positive net-present-value actions.").
53. John Bryant, A Model of Reserves, Bank Runs, and Deposit Insurance, 4 J. BANKING & FIN. 335,
338-39 (1980); Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 33, at 405. In contrast, Bengt Holmstrm and
Jean Tirole stress the problem of unforeseeable liquidity shocks to firms. They argue that
credit lines (contracted for ex ante) provide borrowers with a source of liquidity that is
incentive-compatible because it is supplied at a lower rate than ex post refinancing.
Holmstr6m & Tirole, supra note 52, at 12-14. Integrating these perspectives, Anil Kashyap
and others argue that banks exploit synergies between the provision of on-demand liquidity
to borrowers and depositors. Anil K. Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, Banks as
Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence ofLending and Deposit-Taking, 57 J. FIN.
33 (2002). For further discussion, see XAVIER FREIXAS & JEAN-CHARLEs ROCHET,
MICROECONOMICS OF BANKING 46-49 (2d ed. 2008).
54. Cf Ricks, supra note 6, at 93 (citing "liquidity and price-protection" as the crucial
characteristics of "transaction reserves," or money-like instruments).
ss. See id. at 81; see also FREIXAS & ROCHET, supra note 53, at 4 ("[M]odern banks can be seen as
transforming securities with short maturities, offered to depositors, into securities with long
maturities, which borrowers desire.").
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she might monitor a risky investment.s" This is because her deposit represents
a share of the bank's entire portfolio, which is highly diversified across
borrowers ;s7 because the bank's shareholders absorb all portfolio losses to the
extent of their equity;s8 and because government deposit insurance guarantees
against residual default risk. 9 The result is to allow investments that may be
prohibitively illiquid for some investors, such as homes and small businesses,
to attract financing in a form that is almost as liquid as cash.o
Banking thus plays an essential role in any market economy. The value of
bank-supplied liquidity can be seen, for example, in the extremely low yields
that demand deposits pay. The difference between deposit rates and the higher
interest rates paid on other debt contracts largely reflects the liquidity premium
that depositors are willing to incur for the greater liquidity of a bank deposit. 6,
But a more important clue is the "overwhelming proportion",6 , of capital that is
intermediated through banks: "For centuries, the vast majority of externally
financed investments have been funded by banks, for which demandable-debt
instruments (bank notes and checking accounts) have been the principal source
of funds.",6  However elusive conceptually, the potential value created by
financial contracts that supply similar on-demand liquidity should not be
ignored in scholarship on the shadow banking system.
s6. This function of bank deposits is discussed in Gary Gorton & George Pennacchi, Financial
Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation, 45 J. FIN. 49, 50 (1990). See generally GORTON, supra
note 5, at 219 ("[D]ebt is 'least information-sensitive,' meaning that it minimizes the
incentives for agents to produce private information, creating adverse selection, and that
debt maintains the most value in the presence of aggregate shock.").
57. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in I HANDBOOK OF THE
EcONOMIcs OF FINANCE 431, 455 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003) ("Financial
intermediaries are the natural entities to create such securities, as they hold diversified
portfolios of assets. Consequently, their debt should be used for transactions purposes.").
58. See GORTON, supra note 5, at 48 ("Bank debt is a senior claim on the collateral: debt holders
are paid first and stock or equity is paid last."); Gorton & Pennacchi, supra note 56, at 50.
s9. See GORTON, supra note 24, at 20 ("The need for information-insensitive debt is the logic
behind deposit insurance.").
6o. In fact, deposits are tracked in the Federal Reserve's official monetary aggregates. See H.6 Money
Stock Measures: About the Release, FED. RES. STAT. RELEASE, http://www.federalreserve.gov
/releases/h6/about.htm (last updated Nov. 3, 2011).
61. Cf. Ricks, supra note 6, at 96 (making an analogous argument about the most liquid
money-market instruments).
62. Gorton & Winton, supra note 57, at 433.
63. Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring
Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 497, 497 (1991).
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B. Implications for Bank Resolution
Banking creates value by shifting liquidity risk from depositors to the bank
itself: banks offer a kind of liquidity insurance to their depositors.6 4 However,
the underlying assets on the bank's balance sheet remain illiquid-that is, they
can be sold only at a discount. For this reason, a bank encountering a surge in
withdrawals may itself run short of cash, because it cannot repay its depositors
at par by liquidating portfolio assets.6 s Moreover, individual bank failures tend
to spread to other banks, 6 triggering a deleveraging of the banking system and
a contraction in economic activity.6 ,
Banks' inherent fragility and their susceptibility to contagion effects
generate a compelling need to protect them from the demands of panicked
depositors. However, if the value of bank deposits is closely related to their
liquidity -specifically, the depositor's right to withdraw or transfer her account
balance on demand-then the ordinary bankruptcy protections built around
automatic stays have, at best, problematic application to the resolution of failed
banks.
Ex ante, the risk that an investor's savings will be frozen in a failed
bank makes the deposit contract less attractive, 6  and would likely
reduce the supply of capital made available to the banking system
generally. Perhaps more importantly, this risk would destroy the information-
insensitive quality of bank deposits by forcing depositors to monitor
the solvency of their bank. Credit conditions would then tend to tighten
in response to rising risk perceptions.6 9 In extreme cases, a panic can ensue
64. Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 33.
65. FREIXAs & ROCHET, supra note 53, at 4 ("This maturity transformation function necessarily
implies a risk, since the banks' assets will be illiquid, given the depositors' claims.").
66. During the era of uninsured banking, bank failures tended to produce knock-on effects that
spread to generate system-wide banking panics. By one count, at least ten major banking
panics occurred in the United States prior to the Great Depression. See Charles W.
Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins ofBanking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation,
in FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRIsEs 1o9, 113-15 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1991).
67. See Ricks, supra note 6, at 78 ("By extension, large numbers of near-simultaneous bank
failures can lead to a sudden and severe reduction in the money supply-with
correspondingly severe economic repercussions.").
68. See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 149 ("Liquidity losses occur when depositors are
denied immediate access to the insured par value or, in the case of uninsured depositors, the
recovery value of their accounts.").
69. See Calomiris, supra note 35, at 26 ("The risk intolerance of money market instruments has
been visible historically and in recent times, both in response to idiosyncratic events at
particular banks and firms, and in response to aggregate shocks.").
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when
a shock occurs that is large enough for bank debt to become
information sensitive. It loses its important feature, and so
agents do not want it anymore; they want an asset which is
surely information insensitive- cash. When that happens, the
banking system cannot honor the demands and is insolvent."o
Historically, swings in confidence in the banking system have had sharply pro-
cyclical effects, as the resulting pullback in bank lending worsens underlying
economic conditions.7 ' Ex post, a resolution mechanism that freezes a failed
bank's contracts may badly disrupt the activities of the households and
investors that depend on them."
These factors explain an important aspect of modern approaches to bank
resolution: rather than stymie depositors' recovery efforts, the law has
historically sought to shift losses away from banks' depositors and noteholders
to other, less risk-averse stakeholders. As Bray Hammond wrote in his
landmark history, in the antebellum period the view emerged "that the
obligations of banks were not ordinary debts but money; and that a public
interest was at stake in them which overrode that of any particular debtor and
70. See GORTON, supra note 24, at 32-33.
71. See generally Ben Bernanke et al., The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality, 78 RE.
ECON. & STAT. 1, 1 (1996) ("[C]hanges in credit-market conditions amplify and propagate
the effects of initial real or monetary shocks."). The result may be "a sharp, brief, ultra-
cyclical deterioration of all or most of a group of financial indicators -short-term interest
rates, asset . . . prices, commercial insolvencies, and failures of financial institutions."
Raymond W. Goldsmith, Comment on Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial-Instability
Hypothesis: Capitalist Processes and the Behavior of the Economy, in FINANCIAL CRISES: THEORY,
HISTORY, AND POLICY 41,42 (Charles P. Kindleberger & Jean-Pierre Laffargue eds., 1982).
72. See, e.g., Robert R. Bliss, Bankruptcy Law and Large Complex Financial Organizations: A
Primer, 27 ECON. PERSP., 1st Quarter 2003, at 48, 48 ("[F]inancial institutions provide capital
and other financial services to all sectors of the economy and they form the backbone of the
financial markets, markets that rely to a great extent on trust. Thus, the failure of a financial
intermediary calls into question a multitude of business relations."); Bliss & Kaufman, supra
note 12, at 149 (stating that disruptions in depositors' access to their savings "reduces the
'moneyness' of demand and other short-term deposits by effectively transforming a short-
term liquid deposit into a time deposit of uncertain maturity," and "may produce substantial
negative externalities in the markets served by the bank" which depend on its liquidity);
Ricks, supra note 6, at io8 ("[A] sudden inability to meet transactional needs may lead to
consequential losses -opportunity costs, operational disruption, reputational damage, or
even default."). But see Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, Financial Deregulation, Monetary
Policy, and Central Banking, ECON. REv., May/June 1988, at 3, 16 ("[B]ank failures . . . even at
their worst . .. were roughly of the same order of magnitude as nonbank business failures.
Their aggregate effects appear to have been reasonably well contained . . ..").
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creditor."" Thus, historical bank-insolvency regimes have looked to four
categories of stakeholders to bear losses in lieu of banks' customers: (1) bank
shareholders or insiders; 74 (2) other banks;7 1 (3) taxpayers;76 and (4) the
73. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL
WAR 18o (1957).
74. One early approach was to impose superadded liability on banks' shareholders, abrogating
the common law rule of limited liability. For a discussion of this approach, see Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability ofBank Shareholders: History and Implications, 27
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31 (1992); and Joseph M. Leonard, Note, Superadded Liability ofBank
Stockholders, 14 TEMPLE U. L.Q 522, 522 (1940). Congress ultimately imposed double
liability on bank shareholders in the National Banking Act of 1864, ch. 1o6, § 12, 13 Stat. 99,
102-03. By the late 1920s, federal law and the laws of thirty-nine states provided for some
form of superadded (usually double) liability. Leonard, supra, at 523. More recent law
"singles out those with some insider connection to the failed bank and attempts to shift the
costs of failure from the [deposit] insurance fund to the insiders." Peter P. Swire, Bank
Insolvency Law Now that It Matters Again, 42 DUKE L.J. 469,485 (1992).
Ex ante capital and liquidity standards also insulate banks' customers at shareholders'
expense. For discussion of early reserve and capital requirements, see, for example, Arthur J.
Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, The Causes of Free Bank Failures: A Detailed Examination, 14 J.
MONETARY ECON. 267, 270-71 (1984), discussing the Free Banking Era; and David M.
Gische, The New York City Banks and the Development of the National Banking System
186o-187o, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 21, 25 (1979), discussing the National Banking era. Of
particular significance was a New York statute, enacted in 1838 and widely imitated, that
required bank notes to be backed by deposited collateral. See Michael D. Harter, American
Banking and the Money Supply of the Future, 3 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 559, 562
(1893).
75. A number of early statutes created government insurance funds or imposed mutual liability
among banks to cover individual institutions' shortfalls. New York established the nation's
first bank-obligation insurance scheme in 1829, which combined a member-funded
insurance fund with government supervision of member banks. For comparative discussion,
see Calomiris, supra note 40, at 286-88; and Carter H. Golembe, The Deposit Insurance
Legislation of 1933: An Examination of Its Antecedents and Its Purposes, 75 POL. SCI. 0 18l,
182-86 (1960). Indiana enacted a very different plan in 1834, later emulated in Ohio and
Iowa, which relied on industry self-regulation and unlimited mutual liability among
member banks. One commentator argues that the Indiana scheme proved more successful
than the New York fund because it "aligned the incentive and authority to regulate and
made insurance protection credible through unlimited mutual liability among banks."
Calomiris, supra note 40, at 288.
Member-funded deposit insurance through the FDIC forms a crucial feature of the
current regulatory architecture. For a useful overview of the FDIC's operations, see
Resolutions Handbook, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (2003), http://www.fdic.gov
/bank/historical/reshandbook. In addition to straight deposit payoffs, a notable 1935
amendment to the Glass-Steagall Act expanded the FDIC's toolkit by allowing it to facilitate
mergers among insured banks in order to eliminate weak links from the system. Banking
Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, ch. 614, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 684-703 (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(2) (2oo6)). These "purchase and assumption" transactions came to form
the cornerstone of the FDIC's postwar approach to resolving failed financial institutions. See
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central bank.77 Under present-day FDIC receivership procedures, the
experience of even uninsured depositors "is far better than could be expected
under general corporate bankruptcy where most payments to creditors are
usually delayed until final resolution." The current approach, which is highly
protective of depositors, has enjoyed substantial success in reducing systemic
risk: following the Great Depression, the banking system enjoyed "a panic-free
period of 75 years - considerably longer than any such period since the
founding of our republic."79
The foregoing suggests two salient observations. First, the liquidation
rights built into the deposit contract supply the vector for bank runs-
William M. Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial Services Industry, 1
YALE J. ON REG. 195, 202 (1984) ("During the past 30 years, the majority of bank failures,
and practically all large bank failures, have been handled through [purchase and
assumption] transactions."); Resolutions Handbook, supra, at 19-40 (describing purchase and
assumption transactions).
76. Congress established the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932, but many banks
failed to borrow from it, since doing so signaled weakness and often provoked bank runs.
The First Fifty Years: A Histoty of the FDIC 1933-1983, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 36-37 (1984),
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analyticaVfirstfifty.
77. The Federal Reserve, as the lender of last resort, supplies backup liquidity to otherwise
solvent institutions that might fail due to a liquidity shortage, "when no other lender is
either capable of lending or willing to lend in sufficient volume to prevent or end a financial
panic." Allan H. Meltzer, Financial Failures and Financial Policies, in DEREGULATING
FINANCIAL SERVICES: PUBLIC POLICY IN FLUX 79, 83 (George G. Kaufman & Roger C.
Kormendi eds., 1986). Prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, the New
York Clearinghouse Association coordinated a private form of central banking that allowed
depositors to replace claims on individual banks with certificates issued against the
clearinghouse, backed by all of its member banks. See Gary Gorton, Clearinghouses and the
Origin of Central Banking in the United States, 45 J. ECoN. HIST. 277, 282 (1985); T.B. Paton,
The New York Clearing House and the Associated Banks, 12 BANKING L.J. 593, 607-09 (1895)
(detailing the program).
78. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 175; see also id. at 172 ("The prompt and full payment of
insured-depositor claims at legally closed institutions before the FDIC may have collected
the proceeds from selling the assets has gone a long way to reducing the liquidity losses of
most depositors."). By comparison, bankruptcy creditors are subject, for example, to the
Code's provisions for the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (20o6); the trustee's power to
assume or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases, id. 5 365; statutory priorities, id.
§ 507; the effects of discharge, id. § 524; the trustee's avoiding powers, id. §§ 547-549; and
limitations on setoff rights, id. 5 553; notwithstanding contractual terms providing
otherwise.
79. Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS PAPERS
ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall zolo, at 261, 261, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects
/bpea/fall%2020o1/2oo10bbpea-gorton.pdf.
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withdrawal of deposits -but also the liquidity that makes banking valuable.so
Imposing bankruptcy-style restrictions on depositors' accounts would render
the banking system less efficient and more prone to panics. Second, bank
insolvency law should prevent runs on weak banks without impairing
depositors' rights, and can do so by shifting losses to other stakeholders. It
should be stressed that such approaches do not eliminate risk, but shift it, so
that one set of claims on the bank (the equity) is risky and information-
sensitive, while another set of claims (the deposits) is information-insensitive
and can function as a form of money.
These design principles explain important and surprisingly enduring
features of American insolvency law. In contrast to the pro-debtor bankruptcy
model advocated by critics of the safe harbors, the law governing the banking
sector has traditionally protected the enforcement of liquidation rights against
their issuers, while employing other methods, including deposit insurance, to
maintain system stability. This approach reflects the valuable role that banks'
creation of safe, money-like instruments plays when real assets are imperfectly
liquid.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF SHADOW BANKING
While the banking system has exhibited remarkable stability since the
advent of federal deposit insurance, the cap on insured balances (currently
$250,000) has forced asset managers, governments, and corporations to look
elsewhere for "safe, interest-earning, short-term investments" akin to an
insured deposit.sz This demand has been met by an array of nonbank financial
companies and markets that comprise a kind of parallel banking system for
institutional investors." While a comprehensive discussion is well beyond the
scope of this Note, this Part will describe two transactions, securitization and
repo, that lay at the center of the shadow banking system and its 2008 crisis.
so. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 33, at 403 ("Illiquidity of assets provides the rationale
both for the existence of banks and for their vulnerability to runs.").
a1. See generally Gorton & Pennacchi, supra note 56, at 50 ("By issuing debt and equity securities
against their risky portfolios, intermediaries can attract informed agents to hold equity and
uninformed agents to hold debt which they can use for [transactions].").
82. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 79, at 263; see also GORTON, supra note 24, at 15 ("These
depositors are not willing to deposit, say, $500 million in a bank because it cannot be
insured.").
83. By one estimate, the total assets under management by U.S. institutional investors alone
exceed two-hundred percent of U.S. gross domestic product. Gorton & Metrick, supra note
79, at 276 fig.7.
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A. Securitization: Bank Lending Unbundled
Part I argued that banks create value by transforming illiquid assets into
liquid deposits. Thus "the existence of financial intermediaries implies the
creation of bank loans that banks should be unable to sell [to outside
investors] ."8' However, the advent of securitization-the packaging of bank
loans into tradable debt securities -overcame this constraint by allowing banks
to market their assets to a wide array of institutional investors beyond a bank's
depositor base. Traditionally, banks have intermediated credit by originating
loans and taking deposits, which appear on their balance sheets as assets and
liabilities, respectively."s In a securitization, by contrast, the bank sells pools of
bank loans (such as mortgages) to a special-purpose vehicle, which finances the
purchase by selling investors claims on the pool; these claims are known as
asset-backed securities (ABS). 86 In this way, securitization blurs the line
between banking and the capital markets by allowing large outside investors to
finance loans originated by a bank.
The origins of securitization date to 1968, when the Government National
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) began issuing securities backed by
federally guaranteed mortgages. The Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae) began offering mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in 1981.87
Because the loans underlying these deals (known as "agency" MBS) are
guaranteed by the government, investors in these securities enjoy a backstop
analogous to FDIC deposit insurance.
84. Gary B. Gorton & George G. Pennacchi, Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Nonmarketable
Assets, 35 J. MONETARY EcoN. 389, 390 (1995); accord Lawrence H. Summers, Macroeconomic
Consequences of Financial Crises: Planning for the Next Financial Crisis, in THE RISK OF
EcoNoMIC CIusIs 135, 147 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1991) ("[B]ank assets are illiquid. If all
bank assets could readily be traded on a secondary market, the need for banks would be
greatly reduced.").
8. See Gorton & Merrick, supra note i, at 426 fig.i.
86. See Gary B. Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization, in THE
RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 549, 550 (Mark Carey & Rend M. Stulz eds., 2007); John
H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE
L.J. 165, 172-73 (1997); Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007-2oo8: A Discussion of the
Background, Market Reactions, and Policy Responses, 90 FED. RES. BANK ST. LouIs REV. 531,
537 (2008); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy ofAsset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
133, 135-36 (1994). These securities, in turn, may be packaged into collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs) backed by the mortgage pools underlying each asset-backed security in
the deal. See FIN. CIusIs INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 4, at 128 fig.8.2. For useful overviews
of the securitization process see Gorton & Metrick, supra note i, at 427 fig.2; and Pozsar et
al., supra note 2, at 11-13.
87. Mizen, supra note 86, at 536-37.
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However, the following decades saw securitization spread quickly to non-
agency-backed ("private-label") mortgages, and to other types of consumer
and business debt." In lieu of a government guarantee, these transactions
employ other methods to protect investors from credit risk in the loan pool.
For example, ABS are divided into a series of "tranches" that absorb losses in
reverse order of seniority. The most junior tranche is the first to take losses,
while the senior tranche is paid first and is consequently the safest.89 The use
of tranches gives ABS a capital structure analogous to that of traditional banks,
in which stockholders absorb losses to the extent of their equity before any
uninsured depositors are impaired.
Asset-backed securities, including subprime MBS, "became subject to
explosive demand from investors around the world" in the years before the
crisis.90 By 2005, issuance of securitized bonds exceeded corporate bond
issuance in the United States, "even excluding mortgage-related
securitization." 9' According to the Bank of England, the global ABS market
reached $10.7 trillion at the end of 20o6.92 By 2008, hedge funds and
investment banks had greater combined exposure to subprime mortgages than
88. Id.; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death ofLiability, 1o6 YALE L.J. 1, 24 (1996).
89. See Mizen, supra note 86, at 537-38. For example, a structure may have a "first-loss" or
"equity" tranche, which absorbs losses up to a par value of 3% of the pool; a "mezzanine"
tranche that absorbs losses impairing the next 7%/. of the pool; and a "senior" tranche
claiming the other 90% of the pool. This example is borrowed from Credit Risk Transfer,
BASEL COMMITrEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION 45 (Mar. 2005), http://www.bis.org
/publ/jointl3.pdf. Thus, for example, if the loan pool experienced a default rate of 6.5%, the
equity tranche would be wiped out, and the remaining 3.5 percentage points of losses would
deal a loss of 50% to the mezzanine tranche, while the senior tranche would be unimpaired.
Note that the sponsor typically retains first-loss exposure in ABS deals. By giving the
sponsor a junior position in the payment waterfall, this risk retention should, in principle,
align the sponsor's incentives with those of the other investors, like bank capital in a
commercial bank. See Gorton & Pennacchi, supra note 84, at 409 ("If the selling bank
retained a fraction of the loan or it gave loan buyers an implicit guarantee against default,
this could explain why market participants would buy loans . . . ."); Steven L. Schwarcz,
Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1309, 1316 n.38 (2002).
go. The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. of Gov't
Oversight & Reform, ioth Cong. 2 (20o8) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), http://democrats.oversight.house.gov
/images/stories/documents/2008023100438.pdf.
g. GORTON, supra note 5, at 50.
92. Mizen, supra note 86, at 538.
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the commercial banks that had originated these loans. 93
Securitization thus provided a way for institutional investors to finance
bank loans that had previously been funded by bank deposits.94 But rather
than buy securitized bonds outright, many investors "deposited" funds in
short-term loans, including asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and repos,
which used securitized assets as collateral. While the ABCP market reached
$1.2 trillion at its peak, our focus is on the repo market, which may have
reached $10 trillion, roughly the same size as the total assets of the U.S.
commercial banking sector." Safe and highly liquid, repos furnished the
"deposits" of the shadow banking system.
B. Repos: Shadow Bank "Deposits"
Like bank deposits, repos are short-term debt instruments that are
designed to be highly liquid and insulated from credit risk.96 In substance, a
repurchase agreement is a short-term secured loan, typically made by a cash-
rich investor, which takes securities such as Treasuries, MBS, or other debt
securities as collateral.97 The lender extends credit by "purchasing" the
collateral from the borrower, which agrees to "repurchase" the collateral
(perhaps the next day98) at a small premium over the purchase price.9 9 Gary
93. David Greenlaw et al., Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage Market Meltdown 25 ex.
3.8 (2008) (U.S. Monetary Policy Forum Conference Draft), http://www.chicagobooth
.edu/usmpf/docs/usmpf2oo8confdraft.pdf.
94. See Stuart I. Greenbaum & Anjan V. Thakor, Bank Funding Modes: Securitization Versus
Deposits, ii J. BANKING & FIN. 379, 379 (1987) (describing "the transformation of illiquid
financial claims ... held by depository financial intermediaries, into tradeable ones" through
securitization).
g. See GORTON, supra note 5, at 190-91.
96. See Kenneth D. Garbade, The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions in the 198os, FRBNY
EcoN. POL'Y REV., May 20o6, at 27; Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform, supra note 23, at 6
("Cash lenders use tri-party repos as investments that offer liquidity maximization,
principal protection, and a small positive return, while cash borrowers rely on them as a
major source of short-term funding."). Note that while many market participants enter repo
transactions to borrow cash, an identical transaction (dubbed "reverse repo") may be used
to borrow securities rather than cash. Garbade, supra, at 31-32.
97. Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform, supra note 23, at 3, 7 tbl.1, 19 app. ii.
gs. Safe-harbor-eligible repos may have maturities of no longer than one year. 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(47)(A)(i) (2oo6); 12 U.S.C. 55 1787(c)(8)(D)(v)(I), 1821(e)(8)(D)(v)(I) (2oo6); see
also Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform, supra note 23, at 11 fig.4 (illustrating an hour-by-
hour breakdown of an overnight repo transaction).
gg. "A market participant might, for example, sell securities for $10 million and simultaneously
agree to repurchase them ten days later for $10,oo5,555. . . . [T]his is comparable to
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Gorton explains:
Repos are like demand deposits. One party deposits (lends)
money in a bank, usually overnight, and will receive interest.
To make the deposit safe, the depositor is provided with
collateral in the form of a bond. . . . If the bank fails, then the
institutional investor can sell the bond, without going into a
bankruptcy procedure. . . . The institutional investor can
always withdraw the money, so to speak, by not rolling the
repo.100
Consequently, the lender should incur only negligible liquidity risk to the
extent that the borrower is solvent or the collateral is relatively liquid. Repos
are not just functionally analogous to deposits: the law also treats repos as
money-like reserve assets rather than as risky debt securities.'ox
Repos' predominant use for much of the twentieth century was to finance
Treasury securities,o 2 but since the 198os they have become a key source of
day-to-day funding for financial institutions and an important vehicle for idle
cash held by corporations, governments, and asset managers.'o3 Repos
ultimately became an important method of financing the securitization process
borrowing $1o million for ten days at an interest rate of 2 percent per annum." Garbade,
supra note 96, at 27.
100. See GORTON, supra note 5, at 38. In addition, " [r]epo collateral can be rehypothecated; that
is, the collateral received in a repo deposit can be freely reused in another transaction with
an unrelated third party," so that the repo lender enjoys continuous liquidity even before the
contract matures. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 79, at 277.
io. Ricks, supra note 6, at go ("In area after area [of law], these instruments are treated like
deposits - a classic form of 'money'- rather than ordinary debt securities.").
w02. The original bankruptcy safe harbor recognized only repos backed by certificates of deposit,
eligible bankers' acceptances, and government or government-guaranteed securities.
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 391, 98
Stat. 333, 365 (codified as amended at ii U.S.C. § 101( 47)(A)(i) (2006)). However,
mortgage-related assets were recognized in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 901(e), 907, 119 Stat. 23,
152-55, 171 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101( 4 7)(A)(i); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1787(c)(8)(D)(v)(I),
1821(e)(8)(D)(v)(I) (20o6)).
103. See S. REP. No. 98-65, at 45-46 (1983); Garbade, supra note 96, at 29; Gorton & Metrick,
supra note i, at 432. As the Wall StreetJournal reported in 1979, "Repurchase agreements are
attractive to corporate treasurers for a variety of reasons: they make money, they involve
little if any risk and they provide the liquidity that can't be found in other short-term
investments." Lawrence Rout, More Firms Use Repurchase Agreements as a Way To Earn
Interest on Idle Funds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1979, at 15.
482
122:46o 2012
BANKRUPTCY-PROOF FINANCE AND THE SUPPLY OF LIQUIDITY
prior to the 2008 crisis.' Shadow banks such as Goldman Sachs and Bear
Stearns borrowed extensively in the repo market, offering their structured-
finance portfolios as collateral.os Thus investors "depositing" funds in the repo
market financed asset-backed securities based on bank loans. In this way,
shadow banking "open[ed] up potentially new sources of funding for the
banking system by tapping new creditors.nro6
III. BANKRUPTCY-PROOFING SHADOW BANKING
As Part I showed, the liquidity of a traditional bank deposit depends on two
basic features that have changed little since the 1930s: the withdrawal right and
deposit insurance. Together, these devices render bank deposits highly liquid
and information-insensitive: a depositor is guaranteed substantially
uninterrupted access to her savings, even if her bank fails. Not only does this
protection increase the attractiveness of banking to prospective depositors, but
it also appears to have eliminated the threat of panics in the traditional banking
sector, which occurred with alarming frequency before the advent of the
FDIC. 0 7
The development of similarly liquid, information-insensitive instruments
in the shadow banking system has proven to be a far more intricate -and in
many ways unfinished -problem. First, as the previous Parts have shown, the
marriage of asset securitization and repo-based financing brings together a
complex chain of financial companies and off-balance-sheet vehicles, each of
which introduces an increment of counterparty risk. Second, unlike insured
deposits, the markets for private-label ABS and repos lack an explicit
government guarantee. That is, the shadow banking system must mitigate
risks affecting not only the ultimate borrowers (such as subprime
homebuyers), but also the various entities involved in the intermediation
process. Thus the development of low-risk shadow bank "deposits" has
required extensive contractual innovation and legal accommodation, most
importantly within applicable insolvency law.
104. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 1, at 425 ("Securitized banking is the business of packaging
and reselling loans, with repo agreements as the main source of funds.").
105. See GORTON, supra note 5, at 191.
106. Hyun Song Shin, Securitisation and Financial Stability, 119 ECoN. J. 309, 310 (2009).
107. See supra note 66.
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A. Securitization and Bankruptcy-Remoteness
To transform illiquid bank loans into highly rated securities, a
securitization must ensure that an investor has exposure only to risks affecting
the loans themselves-not the creditworthiness of the sponsor. To accomplish
this, a sponsor moves the loan pool off its balance sheet by "selling" it to a
special-purpose vehicle, which finances the purchase by issuing ABS. This
structure ensures that the securitized loans remain segregated from the
prospective bankruptcy estate of the sponsor. For example, MBS backed by
mortgages originated by Countrywide Financial would have been unimpaired
even if Countrywide had gone bankrupt in early 2008. Additionally, the
transaction documents in a securitization are written to exclude events of
default that would place an ABS issuer itself in bankruptcy. For example, a
missed coupon payment or other significant breach triggers an accelerated
repayment schedule ("early amortization") rather than a court-supervised
liquidation. 10
Together, these contractual devices ensure that ABS deals are "bankruptcy-
remote" - that is, potential buyers can be assured that amounts owed under the
transaction will not be tied up in the unanticipated bankruptcy of the
sponsoring bank or the issuer. In so doing, they ensure that investors need not
monitor the financial condition of the other participants in the securitization
process; they also allow ABS to carry a higher credit rating than the other
entities involved in the deal. Thomas Plank explains that "[s]ecuritization
reduces the bankruptcy tax . . . and therefore has reduced the bankruptcy
premiums charged to the obligors of mortgage loans and other receivables."o 9
B. The Repo Safe Harbors
The relevance of bankruptcy is not limited to the securitization process.
Like bank depositors, repo investors require protection from the risk that the
borrower will fail. In particular, they must be able to sell the collateral in their
possession if the borrower defaults on its repurchase obligation. The investor's
rights in the collateral are akin to the benefit of deposit insurance; they should
guarantee uninterrupted access to cash even if the repo borrower becomes
1o8. For further discussion, see Gorton & Souleles, supra note 86, at 549; and Schwarcz, supra
note 86, at 135-36.
1og. Thomas E. Plank, Toward a More Efficient Bankruptcy Law: Mortgage Financing Under the
2oo5 Bankruptcy Amendments, 31 S. Iu. U. L.J. 641, 654 (2007).
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insolvent."o This is why repos, like securitizations, are structured as "true sale"
transactions rather than as secured debt. Just as securitized loans are "sold" to
an off-balance-sheet vehicle to separate them from the sponsor's bankruptcy
estate, repo collateral is "sold" to the repo investor so that the investor may sell
the assets if the borrower breaches its obligations under the agreement.
A repo investor's liquidation rights in the collateral are thus central to the
deposit-like characteristics of the transaction. Realizing these rights in practice,
however, has involved a decades-long evolution of repo-market institutions,"'
which, as the 2008 financial crisis showed, remains far from complete."'
To appreciate the importance of these rights, it is helpful to recall the
tumultuous path of the repo market during the early 198os, when repos
lacked protection under the Bankruptcy Code and other institutional problems
limited the security of repo collateral. As a result of these issues, a string of
failures by government-securities dealers left many repo investors
holding illiquid, impaired claims on transactions that were supposed to be
liquid and relatively riskless. These ordeals underscored the need to ensure
the effectiveness of each party's liquidation rights in the event of its
counterparty's failure.
An early, dramatic example was the 1982 failure of Drysdale Government
Securities, which had lost money shorting Treasury bonds via reverse repos. (A
reverse repo is simply a repo that the cash lender enters with the motive of
borrowing securities.") Consistent with existing custom, Drysdale's
counterparties had taken cash equal to the market value of the securities
Drysdale had borrowed, with no provision for the interest accruing during the
term of the contract. 14 This meant that when Drysdale failed, its counterparties
held too little cash to replace the securities they had lent. Concern arose that
Drysdale's "failure to pay interest on these borrowings could leave the dealers
short of funds to meet their own obligations" and could cause other dealers to
fail as well.s
11o. See Gorton & Merrick, supra note 79, at 263 (describing collateral in repos as offering
"protection similar to that provided by deposit insurance").
mn. See Garbade, supra note 96 (detailing consequential changes in repo-market institutions
during the 1980s).
112. For discussion, see Tri-Parry Repo Infrastructure Reform, supra note 23.
113. See supra note 96.
114. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1986).
115. Michael Quint, Lessons in Drysdale's Default, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1982, http://
www.nytimes.com/1982/o5/20/business/lessons-in-drysdale-s-default.html.
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The Drysdale affair sparked a crisis of confidence in the repo market."'
Fearing the fallout,"7 "the Fed sharply expanded the volume of government
securities it lends temporarily to dealers who need them to complete
transactions""' and made an extraordinary announcement that it "'stood
ready as lender of last resort' to help commercial banks meet 'unusual
credit demands related to market problems.'"" 9 The ensuing flight from
the repo market depressed demand for Treasury securities as market
participants reassessed the stability of their counterparties and firms
shifted away from short-maturity financing. 2 o
The failure of E.S.M. Government Securities several years later would deal
a similar blow to market confidence. Like Drysdale, E.S.M. had borrowed
securities worth far more than the cash given to its securities lenders.'"' Thus,
E.S.M.'s collapse cast a pall over the solvency of its creditors, which included
numerous municipalities.'" And it precipitated a run on Ohio's thrift industry
when it became clear that the Cincinnati-based Home State Savings Bank had
some $600 million in repo exposure to the bankrupt dealer-an amount
116. See, e.g., John Andrew, Some Expect Shakeout in U.S. Securities, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1982, at
27 ("Now government securities dealers and others on Wall Street are wondering who's
next."); Robert A. Bennett, Less Risk, More Worry for the Banks, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1982,
http://www.nytimes.com/1982/1o/10/business/less-risk-more-worry-for-the-banks.html
("[I] f the retreat from risk goes too far, there are grave dangers. For as the banks pull back,
borrowers are left short of cash, making it tough-or even impossible-for them to repay
their remaining creditors.").
117. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open
Market Committee, 68 FED. RES. BULL. 417, 418-19 (1982) (noting the Federal Open Market
Committee's attention on May 8, 1982, to the impact of Drysdale's failure). Referring to
brokerage houses, a Federal Reserve official warned the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation that "some of these people might be going under." Richard L. Hudson &
Kenneth H. Bacon, How Agencies Helped Avert Drysdale Panic, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1982, at
29,36.
i8. Hudson & Bacon, supra note 117, at 36.
11g. Robert J. Cole, A Dealer in Bonds Defaults on Debt, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1982,
http://www.nytimes.con1982/oS/19/business/a-dealer-in-bonds-defaults-on-debt.html.
120. Michael Quint, Weakness in Treasury Issues: Post-Drysdale Caution Seen, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
1982, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/o6/o7/business/credit-markets-weakness-in-treasury
-issues.html.
121. Warner v. Zent, 997 F.2d 116, 120-21 (6th Cir. 1993); State v. Warner, 564 N.E.2d 18, 23
(Ohio 1990).
122. Martha Brannigan, ESM Collapse Prompts S&P to Add 4 More Municipalities to Credit Watch,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1985, at io.
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exceeding the entire assets of Ohio's deposit guarantee fund."' The resulting
insolvency of that fund forced the Governor to shutter Ohio's
seventy-one state-chartered thrifts.'" News of the chain of failures
rocked international markets, causing the dollar to suffer its biggest one-day
plunge in fifteen years."s
The Drysdale and E.S.M. failures highlighted the need to effectively
collateralize dealings in the repo market. Yet the uncertain treatment of
repos under the Bankruptcy Code prior to 1984 raised a parallel concern
about liquidity risk: even adequately collateralized creditors could face
problems if they became caught in the bankruptcy proceeding of a
failed borrower. This concern gripped the markets after the 1982 failure
of Lombard-Wall, a small government securities dealer,"' and lingered
for months afterward.2 7
Following its bankruptcy filing, Lombard-Wall had argued that the
automatic stay barred moves by its counterparties to exit their repo
positions, ,8 and the court temporarily froze hundreds of millions of dollars in
repo collateral.' 9 Lombard-Wall's failure did not pose credit exposure
123. John Bussey, Gregory Stricharchuk & Martha Brannigan, Thrift's Ex-Owner, Stung by Failure
of ESM, Says He's One of the Victims, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1985, at 20; Todd S.
Purdum, Cincinnati Thrift Unit Seeks Sale: E.S.M. Failure Caused a Run at Home State, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 1985, http://www.nytimes.com/198 5/o 3/11/business/cincinnati-thrift-nait
-seeks-sale.html.
124. Thrift Crisis: Closing of Ohio S&Ls After Run on Deposits Is One for the Books, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 18,1985, at 1.
125. Al Swift, Fed, Not Treasury, Should Take the Lead, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 4, 1985,
http://www.nytimes.conm/198 5/o8/o 4/business/fed-not-treasury-should-take-the-lead.html.
126. Robert J. Cole, Wall St. Securities Firm Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 13,
1982, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/o8/13/business/wall-st-securities-firm-files-for-bankruptcy
.html; Repo Market Remains Weak as Legal Issues Trouble Many Dealers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,
1984, at 43.
127. Repo Market Remains Weak as Legal Issues Trouble Many Dealers, supra note 126, at 43.
128. Robert J. Cole, Forced Sale of Securities Is Opposed by Lombard, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1982, at
37; Gary Putka & George Anders, Two U.S.-Securities Firms File Plea ofBankruptcy, Jarring
Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1982, at 3.
129. Tim Carrington, Securities in Lombard-Wall Case Termed Loan Collateral by a Bankruptcy
Judge, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 1982, at io; Lombard Securities with Buy-Back Plan Are Frozen by
Court, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1982, at 7 ("In its ruling, the court agreed with Lombard that
securities held in connection with repurchase agreements should be considered loans rather
than purchases.").
The same year, the FDIC made a parallel move following the failure of Mount Pleasant
Bank and Trust, deciding that the bank's repo creditors "would have to wait along with
other creditors for their share of the bank's assets remaining after liquidation." Michael
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concerns comparable to those raised by Drysdale because its repo obligations
were adequately collateralized,"o but the automatic stay left Lombard's
creditors unable to sell the collateral and badly short of liquidity."'
Government agencies affected by Lombard's bankruptcy threatened to default
on their bonds,'3 ' and a major money-market mutual fund warned "that its
holders might panic and sell their shares." 3  Hoping "to keep the
wheels moving," the bankruptcy judge later granted partial relief from the
stay for many repo lenders," but he later recharacterized some of
Lombard's repos as secured loans subject to the automatic stay.' Thus,
the Lombard-Wall bankruptcy frustrated the repo market's expectation
that participants would enjoy immediate recourse to the cash (or securities)
in their possession following a counterparty's default. The episode "severely
Quint, Repo Backing Is Under Cloud: Lombard and Iowa Rulings Spur Review, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 29, 1982, http://www.nytimes.com/1982/o9/29/business/repo-backing-is
-under-cloud.html.
130. Cole, supra note 128, at 37 ("Unlike last May's default of Drysdale Government securities,
which nearly touched off a financial crisis, Wall Street took Lombard's collapse with
comparatively little reaction.").
131. Daniel Hertzberg, Lombard-Wall Failure May Cause Losses for Dozens of New York State
Institutions, WAIL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1982, at 4 ("[A] more immediate threat is a cash squeeze
for a handful of the institutions whose unspent construction funds are ioo% invested at
Lombard-Wall. It is possible that the bankruptcy proceedings could tie up the money for
months.").
132. Id. Moody's, the credit rating agency, suspended the ratings on thirty-eight bond issues
affected by Lombard-Wall's collapse. See Robert Metz, Lombard Fall and Ratings,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25, 1982, http://www.nytimes.con/1982/o8/25/business/market-place
-lombard-fall-and-ratings.html.
133. George Anders & Daniel Hertzberg, Lombard-Wall Felt the Effect of Other Crisis, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 16, 1982, at 15, 18; see Martin Baron, Money-Market Funds Are Cash-Rich but Face Some
Problems, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1982, at Ei (noting that "[m]oney-fund managers believe
one of the most serious close-calls occurred" when Lombard-Wall's bankruptcy threatened
the liquidity of the Reserve Fund's repo positions).
This episode repeated itself on a catastrophic scale when the Reserve Primary Fund
"broke the buck" in September 20o8 after Lehman Brothers's collapse left the Fund holding
$785 million in impaired commercial paper and triggered a run on the money markets. See
Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky: Commercial Paper During the
Financial Crisis of 2007-2oo, at 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper, No.
15538, Nov. 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w5538.pdf.
134. Judge Approves Lombard-Wall Creditor Pacts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1982, at 5 (quoting
Edward Ryan, Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York); see More
Securities Sales by Lombard Creditors Are Cleared byJudge, WAIL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1982, at 29.
135. Stephen A. Lumpkin, Repurchase and Reverse Repurchase Agreements, in INSTRUMENTS OF THE
MONEY MARKET 59, 63-64 (Timothy Q. Cook & Robert K. Laroche eds., 1998).
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dislocated [the] financial markets,""' and accelerated investors' post-Drysdale
flight from the repo market.3 7
In reaction to the Lombard-Wall bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve urged
Congress to exempt certain repurchase agreements from the operation of
the Bankruptcy Code.' 8 Congress responded in 1984 with Code amendments
exempting many repo transactions from the automatic stay and the
trustee's avoiding powers.' 9 Additionally, the law established a new,
open-ended exemption for parties' contractual rights to unwind a repurchase
agreement, modeled after earlier carve-outs for securities and commodity
contracts.140 Forming a direct rebuke to the Lombard-Wall ruling, the
1984 amendments sought to eliminate the Bankruptcy Code as an obstacle
to repo participants' access to liquidity in the event of a future dealer failure.
IV. ASSESSING THE REPO SAFE HARBORS
Together, asset securitization and improvements in wholesale funding
techniques allowed institutional investors to finance bank lending through
a structure with liquidity and flexibility approaching that of a traditional
bank deposit. However, the resulting drastic expansion of credit
availability seemingly spurred on the improvident "search for yield"
that brought mortgage lending to increasingly risky borrowers in the last
years of the housing bubble. Hyun Song Shin invokes an image
of an inflating balloon which fills up with new assets. As the balloon
136. Putka & Anders, supra note 128, at 3.
137. Repurchase Accord Issue, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 25, 1983, http://www.nytimes.conm/1983/o1/25
/business/repurchase-accord-issue.html.
138. Lumpkin, supra note 135, at 64; Michael Quint, Securities Dealers in Reforns, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 31, 1983, http://www.nytimes.com/1983/ol/31/business/securities-dealers-in-reforms
.html; see, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-882, at 8 (1984) (statement of Rep. Robert W.
Kastenmeier).
139. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, S 392, 98
Stat. 333, 365 (1984) (codified as amended at ii U.S.C. § 362(b)( 7) (20o6)) (automatic stay
exemption); id. § 393, 98 Stat. at 365 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 54 6(f)) (avoiding
powers exemption).
140. As amended, 11 U.S.C. 5 559 provides in pertinent part:
[T]he exercise of a contractual right .. . to cause the liquidation, termination, or
acceleration of a repurchase agreement because of [the financial condition of the
debtor] shall not be stayed, avoided, or otherwise limited by operation of any
provision of [the Bankruptcy Code] or by order of a court or administrative
agency in any proceeding under the [Code] ....
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expands, the banks ... look for borrowers they can lend to. However,
once they have exhausted all the good borrowers, they need to scour for
other borrowers -even subprime ones. The seeds of the subsequent
downturn in the credit cycle are thus sown. 141
Moreover, the collateral-based safeguards created to protect shadow bank
"depositors" could not ensure the stability of the entire system.'42 As Jeremy
Stein explains, "one of the most damaging aspects of the crisis was not just the
problems of . . . big firms" such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG,
"but also the collapse of an entire market, namely the market for asset-backed
securities." 43
The collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008 provides an instructive stress
test of the repo market and the applicable bankruptcy safe harbors. With
mounting mortgage-related losses and a limited capital cushion, by the end of
2007 Bear Stearns was clearly the shakiest of the large investment banks.'"
Increasingly unable to borrow on an unsecured basis, Bear Stearns turned to
the repo market to replace its commercial paper funding. 45 In early 2008, Bear
Stearns's counterparties began to demand additional collateral or to refuse
exposure to the ailing investment bank. By March 13, it was clear that the firm
could not raise enough cash the following day to continue operating, and Bear
Stearns avoided bankruptcy only by a Federal Reserve-backed merger with J.P.
Morgan. 141
For critics of the safe harbors, the collapse of Bear Stearns and other firms
symbolized the dangers of leaving a systemically important financial institution
without access to bankruptcy protection against its repo and derivative
counterparties. Mark Roe argues that the safe harbors allowed counterparties
to disregard Bear Stearns's weakening risk profile and encouraged the firm to
become overly reliant on a funding method that could dry up virtually
overnight."' David Skeel and Thomas Jackson add that the bailout of Bear
Stearns suggested that regulators were concerned that the disposal of Bear
Stearns's collateral outside the bankruptcy process "could drive down the
141. Shin, supra note io6, at 331.
142. Cf Holmstr6m & Tirole, supra note 52, at 5 (explaining that bank-created liquidity will be
insufficient when there is an aggregate shortage of liquidity).
143. Stein, supra note 3, at 41.
144. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 4 at 256.
145. Id. at 283.
146. Id. at 286-90.
147. Roe, supra note 29, at 552-53.
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values of mortgage-related securities and further destabilize the markets."' 4
This fear, they argue, "suggests that the very [bankruptcy] exclusions that
were justified as reducing systemic risk- allowing counterparties to terminate
(and sell collateral) notwithstanding the automatic stay-can actually
exacerbate it through the very sale of that collateral." 49
These criticisms have motivated a number of proposals to curtail the
bankruptcy safe harbors for repurchase agreements. Roe has proposed that the
filing of a bankruptcy petition should stay repo creditors from demanding and
liquidating collateral.' Skeel and Jackson's gentler call for "transaction
consistency" would allow repo creditors to immediately liquidate the most
cash-like collateral, such as Treasury securities or agency debt, without court
approval, but would impose an automatic stay in the case of "other, more
opaque, forms of collateral.""'s Yet these proposals misdiagnose the source of
the problems affecting the repo market in 2008, and they risk undermining the
efficiency and stability of the financial system
The view that the safe harbors created attractive "incentives"'s for financial
institutions to rely on overnight funding misconstrues the financing choices
facing Bear Stearns and other repo borrowers at the height of the financial
crisis. It was not by choice that Bear Stearns was dependent on $102 billion in
repo borrowings by the end of 2007. Instead, the commercial paper market's
growing aversion to Bear Stearns forced the bank to fall back on repos as the
safest debt structure it could offer its creditors.'s Put differently, the problem
was not that Bear Stearns was excessively dependent on repos at the market's
peak, but that Bear Stearns's other funding sources (principally short-term
commercial paper) became unavailable at the height of the firm's troubles and
could not be replaced except by repos. Far from a source of volatility, then,
repos were in fact a lifeline to a firm suffering from high leverage, a toxic
balance sheet, and growing problems raising funds in the commercial paper
market.
On this analysis, a world without the repo safe harbors would likely have
148. Skeel & Jackson, supra note 29, at 163.
149. Id.
iso. Roe, supra note 29, at 572-73.
151. Skeet & Jackson, supra note 29, at 179. The debtor's post-petition obligations would be
limited to adequate protection of the collateral's value; the debtor would have no further
obligation to post collateral. Id. at 176-77.
152. Id. at 168.
153. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 4, at 283 ("Throughout 2007, Bear Steams reduced
its unsecured commercial paper . . . and replaced it with secured repo borrowing (which
rose from $69 billion to $102 billion).").
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left Bear Stearns in an even more precarious position. Without the ability to
pledge collateral to its lenders free of bankruptcy risk, the firm's options would
have been limited to (i) issuing commercial paper, which it was unable to do
by late 2007, or (2) pledging even more collateral, to compensate its repo
lenders for the growing risk that they would be caught in a Lombard-Wall-
style bankruptcy. Referring to traditional banks, economist Franklin Allen
explains:
Raising new capital is problematic when a bank is beset with
difficulties. The bank is effectively suffering from a debt overhang.
Suppliers of capital will know that in the event of default their money
will go to the depositors and other creditors and so will be unwilling to
supply it.s 4
This problem came to the fore during the financial turmoil of the early 1980s,
when investors not yet protected by the safe harbors chose to withdraw from
the repo market rather than risk tying up funds in costly bankruptcy
proceedings."ss As a Wall Street professional told the Wall Street journal in the
wake of one securities dealer's failure in the early 198os, "There are hundreds
of [repo] transactions out there that look safe until one participant goes
under."s16
These risks were also realized during the 2008 crisis when the market for
commercial paper-an analogous market without safe-harbor protection-
seized up in response to losses taken in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
Nearly $2 trillion in commercial paper was outstanding at the beginning of
2007, the vast majority of which was issued by financial services firms.' Like
repo, commercial paper is a form of short-term debt that must be rolled over
frequently. When Lehman's bankruptcy filing dealt losses to the Reserve
Primary Fund, a large money-market fund, in September 2008, the news
"triggered the modern-day equivalent of a bank run.",, 8 Money funds faced
$172 billion worth of redemptions over the next three days, and the flight of
capital abated only when the federal government announced that it would
guarantee all money fund shares. Still, the industry massively reduced its
154. Franklin Allen, Financial Structure and Financial Crisis, 2 INT'L REV. FIN. 1, 9 (2001) (internal
citations omitted).
155. See supra Section III.B.
156. Tim Carrington & George Anders, Drysdale's Default Shows Dangers of Intricate Financing
Arrangements, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1982, at 29.
157. Kacperczyk & Schnabl, supra note 133, at i.
iss. Id. at 2.
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holdings of commercial paper, whose total outstanding value fell by 15 percent
within a month. To stem the decline, the Federal Reserve made the
extraordinary decision to begin purchasing commercial paper directly; by early
January 2009, it held on its balance sheet 22.4 percent of the commercial paper
market.5 9
Like the episodes that gripped the repo market before the enactment of the
safe harbors in 1984, the panic in the commercial paper market illustrated the
dangers of injecting bankruptcy risk into the instruments used as deposits by
the shadow banking system. 6 o As collateralized lending instruments, repos
mitigate this problem by allowing distressed firms to issue a form of debt with
a risk profile tied primarily to the collateral rather than to the bankruptcy risk
of the borrower.'6'
Critics of the safe harbors correctly note that the mass liquidation of repo
collateral following the failure of a major institution might roil asset markets,
as regulators apparently feared when they decided to bail out Bear Stearns.
Even this insight, however, risks confusing cause and effect. If the financial
markets were incapable of absorbing a massive sell-off of Bear Stearns's assets
in March 2008, it was because liquidity had vanished from every segment of
the credit markets: "[Mloney, corporate debt, securitization, [and]
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) . . . ground to a halt."' 6 Even solvent
firms were conducting fire sales in every asset class in a desperate bid to hoard
cash and retire debt.163
Selling off the assets of a major institution could easily exacerbate these
extreme conditions. However, the critics' proposal to stay the liquidation of
counterparty collateral could hardly improve matters. Instead, it would merely
replace one form of contagion mediated by asset markets with another form,
mediated by the impact of an automatic stay applicable to billions of dollars in
financial contracts on a distressed and highly interconnected market. It could
also make crises more likely by encouraging counterparties to rush for the exits
at the first signs of bankruptcy risk.
159. Id.
16o. See Calomiris, supra note 35, at 24 ("Short-term near money market instruments with a risk
of loss-uninsured deposits, commercial paper, and repos-respond to increases in risk
primarily through [a contraction in] quantity.").
161. See generally Ren6 M. Stulz & Herb Johnson, An Analysis of Secured Debt, 14 J. FIN. ECON.
501, 519 (1985) ("[I]f the existing debt of the firm is risky enough and there is a significant
underinvestment problem one would expect secured debt to be used.").
i62. Tirole, supra note 52, at 287.
163. See Gary B. Gorton, Questions and Answers About the Financial Crisis 14 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15787, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w5787.pdf.
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Like withdrawing bank deposits, liquidating collateral may be benign
under normal conditions yet damaging in the midst of a crisis; as Gorton
argues, "Debt during crises is not the debt of noncrisis times." 6 4 But the
distress facing asset markets during the 2008 crisis suggests a need for
regulators to respond to the crisis, not for Congress to overturn, after the fact,
the legal foundations of the credit markets. Indeed, timely interventions such
as the Term Securities Lending Facility were "uniquely effective" in removing
toxic assets from shadow banks' balance sheets and allowing them to return to
the debt markets with high-quality collateral.' 65 And forward-looking changes,
such as minimum liquidity standards contemplated by the Dodd-Frank Act, e6
offer regulators more targeted responses to funding-market fragility than do
proposals to subject the repo market to bankruptcy risk.
Skeel and Jackson suggest that using a bankruptcy stay to prevent repo
lenders from selling their collateral could give regulators breathing room to
achieve an orderly disposition of these assets.' 6  Yet this is precisely the
approach already taken by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) and the
Dodd-Frank Act's Orderly Liquidation Authority, which provide for a one-day
stay on the closeout of derivatives, repos, and other safe-harbored contracts
pending their transfer to a third-party acquirer or bridge institution.' 8 This
gives regulators a window to rescue a troubled firm without overburdening its
counterparties with an indefinite freeze of their rights in the collateral.
Proposals for a lengthier stay, in contrast, risk undermining the goal of creating
a deposit-like instrument that offers continuous liquidity to investors and a
lifeline for troubled institutions.
Skeel and Jackson also suggest limiting the safe harbors to the most liquid
("cash-like") collateral, such as Treasury securities, since the liquidation of
164. GORTON, supra note 5, at 99.
16S. Id. at 58. Other interventions were conducted through programs such as the Federal
Reserve's Discount Window, Primary Dealer Credit Facility, "Maiden Lane" programs,
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, and, later, successive rounds of quantitative
easing. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 4, at 290, 294-95, 376, 396. The
Treasury Department's involvement included, for example, the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) and the temporary guarantee for money-market mutual funds. See id. at
359, 371-76.
166. For example, Dodd-Frank directs the Federal Reserve Board of Governors to establish
prudential liquidity requirements for banks and nonbank financial companies under its
supervision. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(b)(1)(A)(ii), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1424 (to
be codified at i5 U.S.C. § 8305(b) (1)(A) (ii)).
167. Skeel & Jackson, supra note 29, at 179 n.118.
168. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(io)(B) (2006); Dodd-Frank Act § 210(c)(10)(B), Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1491 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390(c)(1o)(B)).
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these assets is least likely to generate fire-sale conditions."9 However, this
proposal would deny the benefits of the safe harbors to the firms and asset
classes that most need them. Firms depleted of high-quality assets would be
unable to offer their remaining assets as bankruptcy-proof collateral to repo
creditors, and would likely fail. At the same time, illiquid assets could see their
value plunge during crises, since without a bankruptcy safe harbor they would
be useless to repo borrowers. Thus, even a partial rollback of the safe harbors
could limit the efficiency of shadow banking without meaningfully
ameliorating fire-sale risks.
The repo safe harbors allow contracting parties to protect their liquidation
rights from the hazards of a formal bankruptcy process. To be sure, this self-
help regime cannot maintain the stability of the financial system as a whole:
when liquidity is scarce, one party's efforts to seize and sell collateral can
negatively affect the condition of other market participants. However,
repealing the safe harbors would have the perverse effect of exposing entire
markets to instability by leaving parties without any means of contracting
around bankruptcy risk. Moreover, if shadow banks could not offer a deposit-
like liability to investors, then institutional investors would be forced to look to
other, likely less efficient financing methods."o
V. SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION AND THE DERIVATIVE SAFE HARBORS
Repurchase agreements are not the only instruments with liquidation
rights exempted from formal bankruptcy procedures. Derivatives - a much
larger,"' more diverse, and more complex class of contracts - also frequently
permit parties to unilaterally terminate and liquidate their dealings outside of
bankruptcy, ahead of other creditors. These instruments, which allow parties
to take positions on a "reference" asset (such as a corporate bond) or indicator
169. Skeel & Jackson, supra note 29, at 179; accord Acharya et al., supra note 29, at 231 ("[Assets]
that are liquid should keep the exemption. . . . [Assets] that are illiquid-or potentially
illiquid ... would be subject to the ordinary rules of bankruptcy, including the automatic
stay.").
170. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 79, at 267 ("[I]f repo had not been granted this
[bankruptcy-proof] status, the private sector would have sought a substitute, which likely
would have been even less efficient.").
171. The notional value referenced in the credit default swap market alone reached $62.2 trillion
at its peak. Summaries of Market Survey Results, INT'L SwAPs & DERIVATIVES Ass'N,
http://www.isda.org/statistics/recent.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). "Since 1996, the credit
default swap market has seen almost loo percent annual growth. . . It is by far the largest
part of the overall credit derivatives market . . . ." GEORGE CHACKO ET AL., CREDIT
DERIVATIVEs: APRIMER ON CREDIT RISK, MODELING, AND INSTRUMENTS 186 (20o6).
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(such as the London Interbank Offered Rate, or LIBOR) without investing in
the reference entity itself, have an enormous array of applications that are well
beyond the scope of this Note.
However, prior to the 2008 mortgage crisis, these contracts found
prominent use in constructing "synthetic" mortgage-related products that grew
to represent a large share of the assets traded in the shadow banking system.
The bankruptcy safe harbors for derivatives were thus important to ensure that
investors who had purchased these assets (or taken them as collateral) were
unimpaired by the failure of the party with payment obligations under the
contracts. In this limited but important context, this Part argues that the
rationale for the repo safe harbors also applies to the safe harbors for
derivatives used to construct synthetic financial products. Whether the
derivative safe harbors are justified with respect to the far wider universe of
uses to which derivative contracts can be applied is a more challenging issue,
but this Part will conclude by suggesting that they are.
A. Credit-Risk Transfer in Shadow Banking
Part II of this Note described traditional "cash" or "cash-flow"
securitizations, in which loans are sold to an off-balance-sheet vehicle that
issues securities representing claims on the pool. Frequently, the ABS are
themselves pooled and structured into CDOs. These financial products were
often financed by repo lenders, which took these assets as collateral for a form
of short-term lending analogous to a bank deposit. In this way, "the banking
system . . . developed a method by which it could focus on generating assets
while at the same time getting these funded by the capital markets."1 7 2
Synthetic securitization recapitulates this process but with an important
difference: the sponsor need not transfer the underlying assets to the issuer.
Instead, the sponsor executes a credit derivative, such as a credit default swap
or a credit-linked note, that transfers only the credit risk affecting the asset pool
to the investors in the structure. 17 Synthetic transactions proved attractive as a
way for "financial institutions to pass their unwanted credit risks on to the
capital markets" in a cheaper, more flexible manner than could be achieved by
securitizing whole loans.'"4 The synthetic CDO market grew rapidly following
172. Ian Bell & Petrina Dawson, Synthetic Securitization: Use of Derivative Technology for Credit
Transfer, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 541, 550 (2002).
173. CHACKO ET AL., supra note 171, at 200-01. A cash-based deal, in contrast, "brings in addition
to credit risk all the normal risks associated with owning an asset, such [as] interest rate,
prepayment, and currency risk." Id. at 221.
174. Bell & Dawson, supra note 172, at 55o.
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its emergence in 1997, accounting for a large share of total CDO issuance and
becoming a major component of the credit derivative market. 75
Because cash flows in a synthetic CDO are based on an agreement between
the parties, rather than derived from the reference portfolio itself, parties to a
synthetic CDO incur counterparty risk: the risk that another party will default
on payment obligations.' Thus, as in traditional "cash" securitizations, there
is a need to make the structure bankruptcy-remote, so that the resulting
securities are linked solely to the performance of the reference portfolio, rather
than to the credit risk of the sponsor."
Accordingly, the derivatives market and the applicable law have responded
in a manner similar to the repo market: the trend has been toward use of
collateral to eliminate counterparty risk,"7 accommodated by the enactment of
safe harbors to ensure the effectiveness of the parties' liquidation rights. As
with repos, "in most cases collateral posted against derivatives positions is
under the control of the counterparty and may be liquidated immediately upon
a covered 'event of default."1 79 Additional liquidation rights embedded in
derivative contracts allow a party to terminate and net out payment obligations
under outstanding transactions if the counterparty defaults. This is known as
"closeout netting. "io
A simple example will illustrate the importance of these rights to the parties
to a derivative contract. Consider a typical interest rate swap, which might
require Party A to periodically pay Party B $5 million based on a floating
175. See CHACKO ET AL., supra note 171, at 220; YURI YOSHIZAWA, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV.,
MOODY'S APPROACH TO RATING SYNTHETIC CDOs 1 (2003).
176. See EUR. CENT. BANK, CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AND COUNTERPARTY RISK 20 (2009); see also
JAN JOB DE VRIES ROBBa, STRUCTURED FINANCE: ON FROM THE CREDIT CRUNCH-THE ROAD
To RECOVERY 21-22 (2009); Bell & Dawson, supra note 172, at 555-56; James Bullard,
Christopher J. Neely & David C. Wheelock, Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer,
91 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIs REV. 403,407 (2009).
,77. ERIKBANKS, THE CREDIT RISK OF COMPLEX DERIVATIVES 40 (3 d ed. 2004); FRANKJ. FABOZZI
& VINOD KOTHARI, INTRODUCTION TO SECURITIZATION 5 (2008) (describing the need to
"de-link[] . . . the credit risk of the collateral asset pool from the credit risk of the
originator"). The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) estimates that
some ninety-seven percent of over-the-counter (OTC) credit derivatives are collateralized.
Market Review of OTC Derivative Bilateral Collateralization Practices, INT'L SWAPS &
DERIVATIVEs Ass'N 6 (Mar. 1 2010), http://www.isda.org/cand-a/pdf/Collateral-Market
-Review.pdf
178. See, e.g., FUR. CENT. BANK, supra note 176, at 48 (noting "a sharp increase in the use of
collateral in the last ten years: according to the ISDA's findings, two-thirds ofthe net credit
exposures derived from OTC credit derivatives were collateralised at the end of 2008").
179. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 7.
i8o. See BANKS, supra note 177, at 22.
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interest rate tied to LIBOR, in return for $4 million according to a fixed rate.
These obligations, which sum to a periodic $1 million payment from A,
represent a valuable asset for B; thus the swap might have a mark-to-market
value of, say, $10 million. Yet B may also have countervailing obligations to A
under other contracts that reduce A's net liability to B. In this context, the
sudden insolvency of B poses potential problems for A that may be ameliorated
by appropriate liquidation rights.
First, B's insolvency could leave A locked into a position with no potential
upside. While the swap is currently "out of the money" for A, which owes B a
payment stream valued at $io million, an insolvent B would be unable to
perform any fiture obligations to A that would arise if interest rates were to
swing in A's favor. A's right to terminate the transaction protects it from this
risk.S'
Second, B's insolvency could substantially increase A's total exposure to B
by impairing the value of B's countervailing obligations to A. Assume that A
and B have other outstanding derivative contracts, collectively worth $io
million, which are "in the money" for A and thus perfectly offset A's liability
under the interest rate swap. If A and B terminated all their dealings, the safe
harbor for closeout netting would allow them to net their offsetting exposures
to zero, so that no termination payment would change hands.'"' Without the
safe harbor, A could be required to seek relief from the automatic stay or file a
bankruptcy claim for the value ofB's offsetting liability. 8 ,
Third, if we assume instead that A's net position is "in the money," any
collateral available to A would limit its losses in the event of B's default. 8 4
Crucially, A's ability to promptly dispose of the collateral and replace the
terminated contract (instead of being hamstrung by the automatic stay)
minimizes any disruption to its hedging strategy arising from B's default.
Following the template used for repos and other financial products,
181. See id. at 395. Termination rights are enforceable under ii U.S.C. § 560 (2006). Absent this
safe harbor, the bankruptcy trustee would have the right to "assume or reject any executory
contract" notwithstanding the debtor's default. n1 U.S.C. 5 365(a)-(b)(2).
182. Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 6; see also Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives &
Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023, 1058-60
(1994) (describing the mechanics of netting). ii U.S.C. § 56o (2oo6) protects "[t]he
exercise of any contractual right . . . to offset or net out any termination values or payment
amounts arising under or in connection with the termination, liquidation, or acceleration of
one or more swap agreements."
183. See ni U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (2006) (providing for a stay of "the setoff of any debt owing to the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case ... against any claim
against the debtor").
184. See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 20, at 11-12.
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Congress has written safe harbors into the Bankruptcy Code and the FDIA in
order to protect the enforceability of many liquidation rights commonly
embedded in derivatives. In 1990, Congress provided a safe harbor to
closeout netting of swaps in a new Code section 56o,186 and in provisions
relating to the automatic stay and the trustee's avoiding powers.17
Additionally, these protections were given expansive applicability: swaps were
defined as a laundry list of agreements or "any other similar agreement,"' 8 and
eligible "swap participant[s]" included any "entity that . .. has an outstanding
swap agreement with the debtor."'"" The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 represented a major further expansion of the
safe harbors for derivative contracts.190
In these ways, rights to terminate, net out, and liquidate derivative
contracts protect each party from the risk of counterparty default by allowing
each to exit the transaction unimpaired. Significantly, these liquidation rights
also allow synthetic transactions to replicate the bankruptcy-remoteness of a
traditional "cash" securitization by limiting the impact of a counterparty's
bankruptcy on the derivative contracts backing the CDO. Just as the "true sale"
structure of a cash securitization ensures that the sponsor's bankruptcy will not
affect an investor's rights in the securitized assets, so the use of collateral and
the application of the safe harbors ensure that amounts owed under a synthetic
transaction are insulated from the counterparty's bankruptcy risk. For example,
in a typical "funded" transaction, the investors' principal is invested in safe,
liquid collateral that secures any amounts owed to the sponsor or the investors
185. Derivatives enjoy safe harbor under the Bankruptcy Code "in three main areas: (i) allowing
the enforceability of bankruptcy termination or ipso facto clauses, (ii) exempting close-outs,
setoffs and foreclosure on collateral from the automatic stay, and (iii) exempting payments
made under them from preference and constructive (but not actual) fraudulent transfer
causes of action." Vasser, supra note 21, at 1509.
186. Act of June 25, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-311, 5 1o6, 104 Stat. 267, 268 (19)9o) (codified as
amended at ii U.S.C. § 560 (20o6)); see H.R. REP. No. 101-484, pt. IV, at 5 (1990).
187. Act of June 25, 1990, 55 102-103, 104 Stat. at 267-68 (codified as amended at ii U.S.C. 55
3 62(b)(1 7 ), 546(g)).
188. Id. S 101, 104 Stat. at 267 (codified as amended at ii U.S.C. 5 101(53B)); see H.R. REP. No.
109-31, pt. I, at 121 (2005).
189. Act ofJune 25, 1990, § 101, 104 Stat. at 267 (codified as amended at ii U.S.C. § 101(53C)).
19o. Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code:
Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
641, 641 (2005) ("The reforms of 200S ... might appear only to eliminate longstanding
uncertainty surrounding the protections available to financial contract counterparties ....
But the ambit of the reforms is much broader.").
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under the terms of the transaction."' "Unfunded" transactions, in which no
collateral is purchased at the outset, may give investors the right to demand
security based on subsequent declines in the sponsor's credit rating.'9 2
These precautions enable the creation of highly liquid synthetic financial
products that can circulate through the shadow banking system unimpaired by
bankruptcy risk. For institutional investors, these synthetic assets expand the
collateral available for the creation of shadow bank "deposits," while for
borrowers, they may expand credit availability by allowing lenders to
efficiently offload credit risk to outside investors.'93
B. Ongoing Challenges
While the expansive wording of the derivative exemptions aimed to
provide legal certainty to market participants,'94 the boundaries of the safe
harbors remain uncertain and have been extensively litigated in the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy, indicating that legal risk related to liquidation rights in
the derivatives market remains far from resolved.'9 s This litigation provides a
helpful context for investigating the impact of a limitation on the safe harbors
on the liquidity and efficiency of derivatives used in the shadow banking
system.
An important problem concerns the enforceability of provisions giving
priority over a collateral pool to the non-defaulting party in a synthetic
transaction. In a common structure, the investors purchase notes linked to
credit risk in the reference portfolio. The issuer of the notes, a special-purpose
vehicle, enters into a credit default swap with the deal's sponsor (e.g., Lehman
191. See YOSHIZAWA, supra note 175, at 4.
192. See Bell & Dawson, supra note 172, at 556.
193. But see Beverly Hirtle, Credit Derivatives and Bank Credit Supply, 18 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION
125 (2009) (finding limited evidence that derivatives expand credit supply).
194. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, Pt. I, at 125 (2005) ("Express recognition of the
enforceability of such cross-product master agreements furthers the policy of increasing
legal certainty and reducing systemic risks in the case of an insolvency of a large financial
participant."); Morrison & Riegel, supra note 190, at 644 ("By relying on broad market
definitions, the [2005] Act gets judges out of the (largely futile) business of second-guessing
financial contracts.").
195. See generally Lehman Brothers, Sharper Image, Bennigan's, and Beyond: Is Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Working?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, ioth Cong. 8 (2008) (statement of Jay Westbrook, Professor, University of Texas
School of Law) ("Unfortunately, the 2005 amendments not only expanded the scope of the
exemptions but it made them much fuzzier, and much more ambiguous than they had been
before, so that now it is not clear exactly what a swap agreement is for this purpose. . . .").
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Brothers), under which the issuer incurs obligations based on credit losses in
the reference portfolio ("sells protection" to the sponsor). The proceeds of the
issue are used to purchase high-quality collateral that is held in trust for the
benefit of the sponsor to secure its exposure to the issuer's obligations under
the swap.
Such transactions include an important liquidation right for the investors
to protect them from counterparty risk.1' 6 To prevent the collateral from being
funneled into the bankruptcy estate of the sponsor, a "flip" clause reverses the
parties' priority over the collateral, allowing the investors to recover their
remaining principal once the deal is terminated.'9 7 However, in two recent
rulings, the judge presiding over the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy ruled that
such clauses are unenforceable under the ipso facto provisions of the Code,"98
holding that they do not fall within the safe harbor protecting a party's
contractual right to liquidate, terminate, or accelerate a swap agreement."' A
potentially damaging consequence of these rulings has been to reintroduce
196. Aline van Duyn & Nicole Bullock, Lehman Ruling Creates New Doubts for CDOs, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 201o, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/o/88904bfo-iS9-lidf-ad58-oo144feab49a.htl
("It had long been assumed that investors in structured deals -the ones owning the notes -
will get paid before swap counterparties do.").
197. INT'L SWAPs & DERIVATIVES Ass'N & SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. AsS'N, COMMENTS ON THE
SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPERS 6.io, at 15 (2009) ("[I]t is
not uncommon[] for documentation to provide for the priority between the swap
counterparty and the investors to be reversed in the event that the swap counterparty is in
default or insolvent . . . ").
198. These render unenforceable any agreements purporting to modify the debtor's interests
under an executory contract or in property in the event of the debtor's bankruptcy. See ii
U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (2006) ("[A]ny right or obligation under [an executory contract] . . .
may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of the
[bankruptcy] case solely because of a provision in such contract . . . that is conditioned
on.. . (B) the commencement of a case under this title . . . ."); id. § 541(c)(1) (A debtor's
interest in property "becomes property of the estate ... notwithstanding any provision in an
agreement ... (B) that is conditioned on ... the commencement of a case under this title ...
and that effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the
debtor's interest in property.").
19. Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. Ballyrock ABS CDO 2007-1 Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros.
Holdings Inc.), 452 B.R. 31, 40 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v.
BNY Corporate Tr. Servs. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 422 B.R. 407, 421
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2oo). Relying on Judge Peck's ruling in BNY, Lehman Brothers's trustee
has filed suits claiming billions of dollars in additional losses based on liquidation rights
embedded in synthetic transactions. See, e.g., Complaint, Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), No. 08-13555, Adv. No. o-
03547 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2010); Chelsea Emery & Jonathan Stempel, Lehman Seeks
$3 Billion from CIBC, Others in Lawsuits, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2010, 10:25 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68E39D201oo915-
501
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
counterparty risk into the credit ratings of synthetic transactions.2 oo If investors
in a synthetic CDO lack protection from the sponsor's bankruptcy, then the
credit rating applicable to a particular synthetic product can be no higher than
the rating of the sponsor. Investors in such a transaction are thus in a position
comparable to a depositor in an uninsured bank. The likely impact will be to
reduce the attractiveness of the synthetic CDO market while making these
instruments less resilient to volatile market conditions.
C. The Scope of the Rationale for the Derivative Safe Harbors
Thus far, this Part has focused on the limited use of credit derivatives to
create synthetic CDOs that may be used as collateral for repos. However,
because the bankruptcy safe harbors protect a far wider universe of applications
of derivative contracts, this Section suggests a broader rationale for these
provisions. To be sure, the heterogeneity of the derivatives market resists
general statements about the social value of these contracts. Nevertheless, a set
of general functional considerations suggests a plausible justification for the
exemption of the broader derivatives market from the bankruptcy process.
The value of the derivatives market reflects the basic insight that most
financial instruments involve a wide variety of risks, not all of which are
efficiently borne by a given investor. It might be efficient, for example, for a
loan originator to lay off credit risk to outside investors with greater credit-risk
appetites in the form of a synthetic CDO. Similarly, an investor in Tokyo real
estate may find a willing buyer for its exposure to the Japanese yen through a
currency swap; a municipality financing new infrastructure may seek
protection from volatile borrowing costs through an interest rate swap; a hedge
fund may use derivatives to gain greater exposure to risks unwanted by other
market participants. By allowing the distinct risks of a given investment
strategy to be decomposed and shifted to their most efficient bearer, the
derivatives market may facilitate the more efficient supply of capital to valuable
investment projects.2 o' Part II argued that depository banking improves the
200. See, e.g., Evan Jones et al., Lehman Bankruptcy Judge Prevents Trigger of CDO Subordination
Provision Based on Credit Support Provider and Swap Counterparty Bankruptcy Filings, 127
BANKING L.J. 338, 343-45 (2010).
2oi. See Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks Before
the Futures Industry Association (Mar. 19, 1999), http://www.federalreserve.gov
/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19990319.htm (arguing that "[t]his unbundling improves the
ability of the market to engender a set of product and asset prices far more calibrated to the
value preferences of consumers than was possible before derivative markets were
developed"). But see Hirtle, supra note 193.
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supply of capital by allowing households to insure their investments against
liquidity risk. The derivatives market may provide an analogous facility to
investors facing a more diverse array of unwanted risks.
The next step in making a more general case for the derivative safe harbors
is to show that these forms of risk transfer could not be conducted efficiently if
market participants were exposed to the risk of a counterparty's bankruptcy.
For example, a yen hedge with a risky counterparty may be no more palatable
to our Tokyo real estate investor than the underlying yen risk. As a general
matter, derivative contracts that are not insulated from counterparty risk are
less liquid and, to that extent, less efficient than transactions that are liquid.
For example, an "unfunded" synthetic instrument (in which no collateral is
purchased at the outset) cannot be freely traded across the capital markets
because each counterparty must be freshly evaluated for default risk.o20 These
considerations suggest that counterparty risk might frequently prove
prohibitive in the context of an otherwise efficient derivatives transaction.
To be sure, contractual liquidation rights protected by statutory safe
harbors are not the only strategy for managing counterparty risk. A potentially
important innovation in the Dodd-Frank Act is the imposition of mandatory
clearing on many swap agreements,20 3 which would interpose a central
clearinghouse between the parties so that each party faces the clearinghouse,
rather than the other party, as its counterparty.o 4 By alleviating market
participants' need to monitor and guard against the risk of default by their
counterparties, mandatory clearing may improve liquidity in the swaps market
and mitigate some of the core concerns that the derivative safe harbors were
designed to address.os However, traditional counterparty-risk protections,
including collateral and the safe harbors, will have ongoing relevance for the
vast segments of the derivatives market that are not subjected to mandatory
clearing under the Dodd-Frank Act.
202. See Bell & Dawson, supra note 172, at 556-57 ("[T]o the extent that the originator/protection
buyer relies on the investor to make a payment if a credit event occurs, the former needs
some degree of comfort that the latter is going to be good for the money. This cannot be
achieved with a traded instrument that may change hands at the whim of its present
holder.").
203. Dodd-FrankAct § 713, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
204. See Duffie & Skeel, supra note 28, at 13 ("By 'clearing' a derivatives contract, a [central
clearing counterparty] ... becomes the counterparty to each of the two original participants
to the contract. That is, the [central clearing counterparty] becomes the seller to each buyer,
and the buyer to each seller. The main purpose of clearing is to insulate the original
counterparties from counterparty default risk.").
2os. For a discussion of the interaction between mandatory clearing and the derivative safe
harbors, see id. at 13-17.
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Critics of the safe harbors have correctly noted that the use of bankruptcy-
proof liquidation rights to manage counterparty risk is not without substantial
costs. Moreover, these costs are largely borne not by the contracting parties
themselves, but by junior claimants (such as a firm's bondholders) who likely
have little visibility into the size of the firm's liability to its derivative
counterparties.o 6 Thus, for example, whether the benefits of the safe harbors
for Lehman Brothers's heterogeneous derivative counterparties and the wider
derivatives market outweighed the costs imposed on its commercial paper
holders is inevitably an empirical question and a fruitful area for research.
Perhaps the most promising task for future scholarship would be to specify
more clearly the social costs and benefits of derivatives trading, so that
regulators can achieve the most compelling benefits of bankruptcy-proof
finance while aiming to minimize its most serious costs.
CONCLUSION
The safe harbors have faced withering scholarly criticism following the
2008 financial crisis. Critics argue that the safe harbors left troubled firms
without recourse to bankruptcy protection as their counterparties exercised
contractual rights to withdraw credit and seize collateral. In addition to
draining liquidity from weak institutions, these self-help efforts seemingly
roiled the broader financial markets as parties liquidated collateral and replaced
terminated contracts in distressed markets. Scholars also claim that the safe
harbors fueled the pre-crisis expansion of the repo and derivative markets by
according them advantages vis-A-vis other contracts in bankruptcy.
Accordingly, there has been overwhelming agreement in the recent literature
that the safe harbors should be rolled back, leaving repo and derivative
counterparties on more equal footing with other bankruptcy claimants.
In contrast, this Note has argued that scholarly emphasis on the actions of
failed firms' repo and derivative counterparties is akin to blaming bank runs on
depositors' right to withdraw funds. That is, it identifies the contractual vector
that brought down Lehman Brothers and other firms, but does not illuminate a
promising path for reform. Imposing post-petition limits on repo and
derivative counterparties' liquidation rights could not have kept a troubled firm
like Lehman Brothers on its feet.2 o' Worse, such proposals would promote self-
206. See Roe, supra note 29, at 555-60.
207. See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 30, at io ("The major problem stems from the fact that ...
the firm is in liquidation.... Stays can suspend collection of debts but they cannot force
continued rolling over of funding or provision of services.").
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reinforcing panics in these markets by exposing risk-averse capital suppliers to
impairment in a counterparty's bankruptcy. Critics of the safe harbors have
overlooked the extent to which bankruptcy-proof repos offered a lifeline to
Bear Stearns, for example, which had lost access to unsecured funding sources
amid the market's flight from bankruptcy risk.
To be sure, the safe harbors alone do not furnish a comprehensive
framework for resolving large financial institutions, let alone for ensuring their
stability. The rescues of Bear Stearns and AIG in 20o8, like that of Long-Term
Capital Management ten years earlier, put regulators in the ironic position of
bailing out institutions precisely to prevent the disorderly unwinding of these
firms through the recovery efforts of their counterparties."o Yet in each case,
regulators chose not to prop up the bailed-out firm through a stay of its
obligations, but rather to supply emergency funds to ensure these obligations
were met. Thus these episodes are consonant with the basic structure of
modern bank regulation, which insures depositors rather than staying their
claims."' Criticism of the safe harbors' role in these episodes is, at best, a
distraction from more pressing questions about how to regulate and structure
emergency assistance to shadow banks.
More broadly, I have argued that the safe harbors play a valuable role in
enabling institutional investors to finance traditional bank lending through the
structured-finance and repo markets. If deposit-taking banks have historically
supplied the overwhelming share of the economy's external investment
capital,2"o then scholars should not underestimate the potential value of
analogous contracts issued by shadow banks. By aiding the flow of
institutional investment into traditional bank assets, liquidation rights
embedded in repos and derivative contracts help to transform vast reserves of
"dead capital" into "live capital" available to homebuyers, entrepreneurs, and
other borrowers."' To be sure, the mortgage bubble and subsequent credit
crisis underscore the potential consequences of sudden transformations in the
zo8. See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 29, at 94 (noting this irony in the context of Long-
Term Capital Management).
209. Critics have argued that curtailing the safe harbors could enhance market discipline by
forcing parties to manage their exposure to potential losses stemming from their
counterparties' risk taking. See supra note 31. Yet as Ricks observes, "market discipline by
money-claimants is incompatible with financial stability: runs and panics are the very
manifestations of market discipline by short-term creditors." Ricks, supra note 6, at 139.
210. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
211. Tirole, supra note 52, at 299 (citing HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY
CAPITALiSM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EvERYwHERE ELSE (2003)).
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financial system. 12 These opportunities and dangers should challenge
lawmakers to manage the flow of this capital based on principles drawn from
our successful experiments in bank regulation during the twentieth century.
5o6
212. Historically, sudden credit expansions frequently fuel credit bubbles followed by downturns
in the credit cycle. See Allen, supra note 154, at 7.
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